Richard Stuart Ross,
Petitioner,
v.
United States of America,
Respondent.
Introduction and summary of argument
This case entails competing interpretations of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A). As Richard Stuart Ross’s petition for a writ of certiorari describes, the Second Circuit is now the fourth court of appeals to have interpreted the “substantially prevail[ing]” standard under CAFRA in a way that conflicts with this Court’s precedents and that has caused confusion as to the proper resolution of several related questions.
As explained in the Petition, Congress chose not to limit attorney fees only to a “prevailing party,” which is a term of art employed in other statutes. See Pet. at 1, 10. Yet multiple courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit here, have erroneously equated CAFRA’s fee-shifting language with a “prevailing party” provision.
Amici submit this brief because the Second Circuit’s approach is flawed for an additional reason: ignoring the text of § 2465(b)(1)(A) negates the incentives crafted by CAFRA’s fee-shifting provision. As explained below, economic theory suggests that fee shifting in this context would meaningfully deter the filing of inefficient and unmeritorious civil asset forfeiture actions, such as the one in this case—a practice that, as recent events indicate, is common nationwide. The Second Circuit’s holding, however, eliminates this important constraint on meritless and wasteful civil asset forfeiture actions.
Amici respectfully request that the petition for a writ of certiorari be granted so the incentive structure adopted by Congress may be reestablished in the interests of efficiency and justice.
Full brief: Ross v. United States: