- Concession fees for express lane projects?
- The hold-up problem for major infrastructure
- Making over a failed Texas toll road
- Why EVs aren’t powering our electricity grid
- Toronto’s competing expressways
- Bipartisan permitting reform and transportation
- Transit frequency vs. coverage
- News notes
- Quotable quote
Do Concession Fees on Express Toll Lane Projects Make Sense?
A recent trend in long-term public-private partnerships for express toll lanes is the inclusion of a multi-billion-dollar concession fee that many bidders now include in their proposals. If three teams are short-listed, with comparable public-private partnership (P3) express toll lane experience, the state transportation department may well select the company offering the largest concession fee.
Traditionally, up-front concession fees have been standard practice in brownfield concessions; they are considered the price of admission for the short list of qualified bidders. But recently, concession fees have been showing up in winning proposals for greenfield express toll lane projects being done as long-term design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) concessions.
Two recent projects received large concession fees. The winning teams in Tennessee for I-24 and in Georgia for I-285 agreed to pay fees of $24.8 billion and $23.6 billion, respectively. For state departments of transportation (DOT), multi-billion-dollar concession fees are, in many ways, free money that they can use to address their backlog of currently unfunded projects.
A key question is who ends up bearing the cost of these multi-billion-dollar concession fees. Some recent commentary suggests that the long-term value of the concession makes it a wise expenditure for the concession company. But I’m not sure this is correct.
Express toll lanes are certainly providing large benefits to road users, as documented in reports by Fitch Ratings and others. And as long as state DOTs keep toll rates in line with properly managing traffic flow, that will remain true. And equity investors in P3 express lane projects should continue to receive the return on investment assumed in their models.
But how does a P3 company get a return on a large concession fee? Cintra has been part of the winning team for both the Tennessee I-24 project and the Georgia I-285 project, offering huge concession fees of $24.8 billion (I-24) and $23.6 billion (I-285), the first commitment in early September and the second in October.
Would those commitments affect the company’s stock price? A monthly price summary for Cintra’s parent company, Ferrovial (FER), on NASDAQ showed that its shares reached a high of $74.07 in February and had ups and downs in the $60s over most of the summer. But FER finished August at $59.94 and then slid to $49.86 by mid-October. The large concession fee for I-24 was promised around the end of August, followed by the one for I-285 in October.
How can P3 concessionaires afford such large added expenses? Assuming continued economic growth in the metro areas where express toll lane projects are implemented, toll revenues will continue to grow. Will that increasing toll revenue be enough to repay the P3 team for the up-front concession fee?
Many of the P3 express toll lane projects have terms of 50 years or more. If the concession fees were a commitment to pay annual amounts over that term, I wouldn’t be as concerned. But since that is not the case, how do concession companies justify their large up-front concession fees?
Perhaps they don’t plan to be the developer/operator for 50 years but expect to put the concession up for sale in, say, 25 years (if the state DOT agrees). In year 25, they could put the remaining 25 years of the concession up for bid, with a proven toll revenue track record and much of the original debt paid off. At that point, would they be paid enough to recover what they spent on the concession fee?
We are just starting a learning process about up-front multi-billion-dollar concession fees. At this point, I’m skeptical that this is an improvement on the original express toll lanes P3 concession model. You can’t blame state transportation departments for being happy to accept an up-front windfall. Even if states don’t require an up-front concession fee, they are more likely to select a competent P3 proposal that includes a large chunk of free money up front. That does not make this a wise policy.
Addressing the Hold-up Problem for Infrastructure Projects
It happens all too often in the lead-up to financing and building a large infrastructure project. Opponents may wait until the project has been approved by the state department of transportation (or other agency) and then file suit or lobby agencies such as transportation planning organizations to pull the plug. I have reported in this newsletter on a recent case in North Carolina in which express toll lanes are planned near where North Carolina’s I-77 reaches the South Carolina border. That project was approved by the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) and the Charlotte Regional Transportation Planning Organization (CRTPO) several years ago. NCDOT had begun seeking teams for a major public-private partnership project to develop, finance, and operate the express lanes. But once NCDOT began procuring a P3 developer/operator, CRTPO members changed their minds and vetoed the project.
Unusually for such cancellations, this one was recently reversed, but that is not typical. In the September issue of Public Works Financing, Editor Michael Bennon wrote a thoughtful critique of this all-too-common debacle. He explains that this problem is widespread in large public works projects. It’s referred to as the “hold-up problem.” It occurs when one party wants to make a costly investment that is dependent on another party. “The more you have invested, the more leverage the other party gets.”
For large U.S. infrastructure, Bennon cites three reasons why this is a major problem. First, permitting and planning the project is costly and time-consuming. Second, US permitting laws make it extraordinarily easy for various stakeholders to intervene to block or delay the project. And third, U.S. permitting laws often allow for “mitigations” demanded by opponents. That set of facts creates what Bennon terms “the permitting hold-up.” What gives opponents leverage is that the state DOT and/or the project developers have already invested sunk costs, so they will likely feel pressed to give in to some of the demands. Opponents know this and are motivated to intervene late in the process, giving them leverage against the state DOT.
Bennon suggests a solution: make potential project cancellers pay. He again turns to the NC I-77 South project. After CRTPO canceled the project, the NC legislature passed a law to require those cities and towns that supported cancellation to reimburse the state DOT for the millions of dollars it had already spent on the project—nearly $69.6 million. It gave those cities and towns until early October to reconsider, and only those that continued in opposition would have to pay the DOT for those expenditures. As Bennon reports, one after another cities and towns reversed their opposition, as did the Charlotte City Council itself. He concludes by suggesting a state-level reform: make cancellers pay the sunk costs.
Note: Bennon’s article has much more detail and is well worth reading, since this “hold -up” problem is widespread.
Making Over a Failed P3 Highway in Texas
The 41-mile southern section of State Highway 130 (between Austin and San Antonio) was begun in 2001 as the first link of a proposed Trans-Texas Corridor. It was built via a long-term public-private partnership by Cintra and Zachry. Traffic and toll revenue in the early years were far below projections, and the P3 filed for bankruptcy in June 2017. The project was a recipient of one of the earliest federal Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loans. In the bankruptcy settlement, TIFIA acquired half the equity in a new SH-130 Concession Company. The current owner of the other half is Strategic Value Partners LLC (SVP Global). The concession company’s current CEO is Ananth Prasad, a P3 consultant and former Florida Department of Transportation Secretary.
Prasad and his team have been working diligently to make their southern 41 miles of SH-130 into a viable competitor to I-35 in that portion of Texas. One challenge is that this 41-mile portion of SH-130 charges tolls. Truck drivers and trucking companies generally dislike tolled highways and seek to avoid them. Prasad’s team seeks to make their toll road a viable alternative to often-congested I-35, seeing truck traffic as far more lucrative than personal vehicles.
In an interview with the Austin Business Journal, Prasad discussed the recent rise in truck traffic on their 41 miles. Since 2019, overall traffic has increased by 86%, with heavy-truck traffic growing by nearly 130%. A lot of truck traffic is international freight hauling. The company’s challenge is to attract long-haul truck traffic away from non-tolled I-35 to tolled SH 130. One benefit is little or no congestion, compared with I-35. Prasad told the interviewer that SH-130 is currently filling up only one-third of its capacity.
Prasad’s priority is to attract more long-distance truck traffic away from I-35. Current projects include adding truck parking, including an under-construction travel plaza in southern Caldwell County that will include over 150 truck parking spaces, a convenience store, dog parks, and restaurants. Another program is a partial rebate of toll revenue, which, over the most recent year, provided over $700,000 in rebates to trucking companies.
Prasad and his team communicate with the trucking industry about the lack of congestion on SH-130, as evidenced by data showing that trucks on SH-130 reach their intended destinations within 15 minutes of planned drive time 99% of the time. He told the Austin Business Journal that trucks using I-35 may be incurring higher costs than those paying tolls on SH-130. That’s due to increased fuel consumption and delays on I-35. He also cites data showing that vehicles on SH-130 are 80% less likely to experience a crash than those using I-35.
Why Electric Vehicles Aren’t Powering Our Electric Grid
A vision shared by many electric vehicle fans is that these vehicles could (and should) be hooked up in people’s home garages overnight to feed electricity to the electric grid (presumably with reimbursement for this energy from their local electric utility). To the dismay of many advocates, this isn’t happening. Joann Muller sought to explain this in an Axios article, where she lamented that despite the surge of power-hungry data centers, “millions of parked EVs could help utilities manage power shortages, lower costs, and keep the lights on.”
Muller takes an engineering approach to explaining why this isn’t happening. She cites “expensive equipment, complicated utility regulations, and consumer skepticism” as key reasons. There is something to that, to be sure. Home charging and backup power hardware cost about $5,000 today, which does not seem like a sensible expense for most electric vehicle (EV) owners. Ford plans to introduce a new home charging and backup power unit at an estimated $2,100, but it’s still hard to see why the average EV owner would shell out that kind of money.
Part of this EV vision is that EV owners could make money by selling electricity to the grid while their EV is parked overnight. But I don’t think that’s an appealing prospect: starting the next day’s journey with a reduced electricity supply on board. Those of us still driving fossil-fueled vehicles know there are ample gas stations where we live and drive, compared with the relative scarcity of EV charging locations. Not knowing what travel demands may arise in the next day or next week, most people keep an eye on their gas gauge to be prepared for whatever may come along.
Starting the day with a depleted on-board electricity supply doesn’t account for unexpected travel that may await the EV owner. That’s a reasonable hypothesis for why few people feed electricity from their electric vehicles to the grid at night.
Competing Expressways in Toronto Offer Commuters a Choice
Two expressways cross the Toronto metro area: the close-in 401 and the farther-out 407. The major difference between the two corridors is that the 407 charges tolls and the 401 does not. Hence, commuters have a choice during rush hours: drive in congestion (401) or avoid it by paying a toll (407). Geotab’s Altitude publication carried out a study comparing the travel experience on each expressway during morning and afternoon commute hours.
According to Altitude’s report, the 407 tolling was initially proposed as a temporary measure to pay off the construction cost of that expressway. But after the 407 was sold to private investors in 1999, the toll became permanent, as both an ongoing revenue source and a means of reducing congestion.
The study compared peak-period traffic flows on the two corridors. As expected, peak-period congestion is severe on the 401, but peak-period traffic flows smoothly on the tolled 407. The data showed that the 401 was congested for the majority of the day (not only during the peak periods). Peak period traffic on the 407 was generally non-congested, with traffic moving at or a bit above the speed limit. Vehicles on the 401 during the day may spend as much as twice the time spent by 407 commuters, and truck traffic showed similar differences. On an annual basis, 401 motorists spent several hundred more hours commuting than those using the 407.
How high are the 407 tolls (in US dollars)?
- Between 6 and 7 am, the light-vehicle charge is $31, and the heavy-duty truck charge is $61.
- During the morning peak, light vehicles pay $35 and heavy-duty trucks pay $70.
- Early afternoon toll for light vehicles is $33 and for heavy trucks $66.
- Evening tolls (from 3:30 to 6 pm) are $38 for light vehicles and $74 for heavy trucks.
On average, light vehicles are paying $45 per hour of saved time, while heavy trucks are paying $88 per hour saved.
These numbers add up for every weekday customer. The study calculated that light-duty vehicles using the 407 every weekday evening would pay $9,578 per year, while heavy trucks doing likewise would spend $18,976 per year. That’s a lot of money, but those who pay the tolls regularly must obviously value the time savings accordingly.
One other set of calculations looked into emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), a pollutant and a greenhouse gas. According to the International Council on Clean Transportation, heavy trucks operating under stop-and-go congested conditions emit NOx 10 times as high as those operating in free-flow uncongested traffic. Thus, the 407 is doing its bit to reduce NOx emissions from heavy trucks.
How the Bipartisan Permitting Reform Deal Could Benefit Transportation
By Marc Scribner
After 18 months of work, the “four corners” of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and Energy and Natural Resources Committee on Sept. 30 released the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA, S. 5653). The comprehensive permitting reform legislation faces a compressed schedule—five weeks during the lame-duck session—to secure passage in the Senate and House before going to President Trump for his signature. The energy sector is the biggest winner, but BAAJA contains numerous reforms that would benefit transportation infrastructure project delivery that are worth highlighting.
BAAJA incorporates long-sought reforms to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review process. These include changes to which projects are considered a “major federal action” subject to the NEPA process. The test of federal “sufficient control and responsibility” to trigger NEPA would be replaced by “predominant control and responsibility.”
While the precise definition of “predominant” in terms of grant award thresholds will be left to implementing agencies, this provision would exclude all projects where the only federal involvement is a loan or loan guarantee, such as through TIFIA. It would also exclude “lifeline” highway and bridge restoration and replacement projects if the work is conducted in the immediate vicinity of the existing facility and does not add new travel lanes. There are several other additional exclusions, but the upshot is that fewer projects will enter the costly NEPA review process in the first place.
For those projects that remain subject to NEPA, BAAJA would impose new deadlines for application review, public comment periods, and permitting decisions. If a deadline is missed, project sponsors can seek a court order to compel the agency to move more rapidly. In the case of disagreements between multiple agencies on how to conduct the review of a given project, which can lead to lengthy delays, BAAJA would establish a new process by which project sponsors could bring interagency disputes to the White House Council on Environmental Quality for speedy and final resolution.
In addition to the environmental review process itself, NEPA litigation is a major source of project uncertainty and cost increases. Under the status quo, permitting decisions made pursuant to NEPA environmental review are litigated under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which governs the federal regulatory process. The APA default is poorly suited to infrastructure projects procured and financed by non-federal entities. In 2024, Reason Foundation published a study on these problems, and BAAJA attempts to remedy many of them. BAAJA’s NEPA judicial review reforms include:
- Limiting standing to those who submitted public comments that were “sufficiently detailed to put the applicable Federal agency on notice of the particular issue on which the party seeks judicial review” and requiring that claims allege “an actual or imminent injury in fact amounting to a direct harm.” This would reduce NEPA “strike suits” based on vague concerns that serve principally to encourage self-serving settlements or project abandonments, rather than mitigating real environmental injuries.
- Reducing the statute of limitations from the APA default of six years to 150 days, with the clock starting the day the project authorization is published in the Federal Register or on an agency website.
- Codifying the holding from the Supreme Court’s Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County (2025) that reviewing agencies are owed “substantial deference” by courts “relating to the scope and contents of an environmental document.” Second-guessing by courts on environmental effects analyzed in NEPA documentation creates inconsistency in how the law is applied and leads project sponsors to waste time producing thousands of pages of “bulletproof” documentation against potential second-guessing by courts.
- Narrowing NEPA violation remedies to agency remand, rather than allowing courts to void permitting decisions or temporarily halt projects based on deficient NEPA documentation and decision-making. Plaintiffs would still be able to seek injunctions under most environmental permitting laws (e.g., Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act) and challenge an agency’s NEPA decision under APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, like all other regulatory decisions.
In addition to NEPA, BAAJA would also make substantial changes to permitting under the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and National Historic Preservation Act with implications for transportation infrastructure project sponsors. The Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations has developed a transportation-focused summary of BAAJA’s key provisions, and the Bipartisan Policy Center has a broader summary of the bill. Both are worth reviewing.
While the bill is not perfect from my point of view—such as the Section 2107 provision on ratepayer protection from data centers that differs from the approach favored by my Reason Foundation technology policy colleagues—it is a significant achievement in advancing serious federal permitting reform policy. Chairs Capito and Lee and Ranking Members Whitehouse and Heinrich deserve credit for negotiating such a complex and substantive bipartisan bill, especially in the current acrimonious political environment. Taken as a whole, it is clear that the good of the bill far outweighs the bad.
The window of opportunity to enact these changes is closing and may only extend to the remaining weeks of the 119th Congress. Members of Congress who object to certain provisions should recognize that the alternative to this bill is not a better permitting reform bill—it is perpetuating the unacceptable status quo. It would be a shame if lawmakers let the perfect be the enemy of the good and squandered this unique opportunity.
Transit Frequency vs. Coverage
By Baruch Feigenbaum
One of the central tensions in operating transit service is deciding whether the agency will prioritize transit frequency or transit coverage. Frequency is the amount of service on a given route. Coverage is how many routes are operated in a given transit agency service area. Unless you are the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of New York, U.S. agencies do not have the financial resources to prioritize both.
What is the difference? An agency focusing on frequency would place routes on a limited number of main travel corridors with high residential and employment density. These areas are typically in the center of the urban area. Service would be placed on the busiest streets in an area, but probably not on state highways.
An agency focused on coverage would add bus routes throughout the region. More commuters would have access to transit, pleasing political leaders. The challenge is when everybody gets service, nobody gets particularly good service because agencies need to spread the same number of buses over a much larger geographic area.
One advantage of frequency-based service is that if agencies are able to double the number of buses serving an area, headways (time between buses) may drop from 30 minutes to 15 minutes. This focus on frequency tends to increase ridership, and many transit planners call it a “ridership” focus.
Ten years ago, the conventional wisdom was to provide service to as many square miles of the geographic region as an agency could serve (an extreme example of the coverage case). That meant, in most regions, having routes with headways of 30 minutes (or even one or two hours in some cases). Riders would frequently complain that the service was too slow or inconsistent. Even transit-dependent riders who did not have easy access to a car would catch a ride from somebody they knew because it was better than waiting an hour for a bus.
But attitudes started to change during the pandemic. Transit agencies, with escalating costs and declining ridership, decided to focus on core transit areas. They cut routes to the hinterlands and added service in the core city and inner suburbs. These changes had several advantages. First, by focusing on a smaller region, agencies could get the same number of passengers with fewer miles, reducing costs for everything from fuel to labor. Second, ridership increased. The two most important factors for choice transit riders (those who have access to an automobile) are service that is reliable and service that is frequent. Reducing headways from 30 minutes to 15 minutes might not double ridership, but it can come close.
Today there is widespread consensus that transit agencies should focus on frequency and not coverage. But what can policymakers do about riders who live in low-density areas? Abandoning low-income and disabled riders is neither a great moral policy, nor one that will work politically.
One solution for low-density areas is to replace fixed-route service with microtransit and demand-response transit. Many metro areas have partnered with Via to operate a $5 shuttle-based ridesharing system. More than 50 cities and transit agencies have partnered with the company, including Arlington (Texas), Chicago, and Los Angeles. Via customizes its service based on local needs. Unlike traditional public transit agencies, Via has been able to secure private funding. Mercedes-Benz has invested $50 million in a joint venture with Via. The company has raised approximately $137 million in funding from investors.
Even when public agencies don’t contract with a private provider to operate the service, they may do so for some back-office functions. For example, Ride On (the transit system in Montgomery County, MD, in the Washington, D.C. region) is piloting paratransit service in two areas with medium residential and employment density. Via developed the Flex app that Ride On will use while the county operates the buses. These partnerships are not just for large metro areas but for smaller regions as well. The Central Ohio Transit Authority (COTA) is also partnering with Via on a customizable app. These public-private microtransit services are the fastest-growing type of transit service.
The good news is that most transit agencies have embraced the frequency side of the frequency/coverage debate. But the agencies still need to have quality service for the low-density regions. Today, agencies can provide the service through paratransit. However, many agencies need to improve their paratransit services or contracts.
Losing Bidder Sues Tennessee DOT
A team led by Acciona, ACS, and Meridiam filed suit against the Tennessee Department of Transportation, seeking access to all data on the competing teams for the I-24 express toll lanes project. The winning team (Cintra, Transurban, and Tikehau Star) offered a huge $24.8 billion concession fee and estimated the express lanes project would cost $9.2 billion to construct. The Acciona team offered a $7.25 billion concession fee and a construction cost of $12.8 billion.
Brightline Florida Keeps Trains Running—for Now
In The Bond Buyer, Caitlin Devitt reports that only a debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan is enabling the trains to continue operating. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Sept. 24, but the trains keep operating, and I get promotional emails almost every day offering affordable trips on Brightline.
Meridiam Raises $4.5 Billion for Core Infrastructure Fund
Meridiam reached financial close on its first North American infrastructure fund, Antonio Fabrizio reported in Infralogic (Oct. 25). Its initial portfolio includes the Port of Miami Tunnel P3 project, the LaGuardia Airport Terminal P3 project, and the Long Beach Courthouse P3 project. The newsletter reported that one of the initial investors in the fund is the Maine Public Employee Retirement System.
Las Vegas High-Speed Rail Project At Risk
Dan Zukowski reported for SmartCitiesDive that the Brightline West high-speed rail line between Las Vegas and Southern California is in dire straits. According to The Bond Buyer, it had until Nov. 2 to make a $400 million equity investment in the project, originally due last March. It was hoping for a $6 billion Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan from the federal government by late October. The project’s estimated cost has increased from $12 billion in 2024 to $21 billion in 2026.
French Companies Launch Electric Truck Charging Partnership
Antonio Fabrizio reported in Infralogic (Sept. 9) that Vinci Concessions has signed a partnership agreement with two French infrastructure managers to build a network of charging stations for electric trucks. The initial focus will be along French highways, but the plans include expanding to other European countries.
Austin Toll Road May Be Extended
The Central Texas Regional Mobility Authority (CTRMA) has proposed extending the US 290 toll road in Austin by 13 miles. The east-west US 290 connects north-south US 183 and SH 130. The project will include adding flyover connectors between US 290 and SH-130. The project cost is estimated at $127 million.
Another Link in Planned I-69
Spanish contractor Sacyr has completed a $146 million project to enable US 59 to bypass the town of Diboll. The project included construction of 28 bridges. This section of US 59 is expected to be incorporated into the planned I-69 in the future. Texas Department of Transportation is incrementally upgrading over 1,000 route-miles of existing corridors (US 59, US 77, and US 281) to become part of the new I-69.
Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel Expansion Enters Last Phase
VirginiaBusiness.com reported last month that the $3.9 billion project will be completed in 2027. Construction began in 2020 on the project, which will have six lanes on land and eight lanes within its tunnels. The original bridge-tunnel (now 74 years old) was designed for 70,000 vehicles/day, while the expansion will increase this to 130-140 thousand. For this expansion, tunnel boring machines excavated two additional tunnels.
Cintra Consortium Wins Czech Highway P3 Project
Infralogic reported that a team led by Ferrovial company Cintra has been selected by the Transport Ministry to complete the D35 highway between Opatovec and Mohelnice. The Cintra team includes Strabag, Budimex, and Invesis. The P3 project will make use of availability payments, rather than tolls. Completing this section of the highway will improve travel between Bohemia and Moravia and enable much traffic to bypass smaller municipalities.
Private Companies May Run UK Toll Roads
In Auto Express (Oct. 6), Tom Jervis reported that the United Kingdom’s government plans to allow the private sector to finance major highway projects and recover their costs from toll revenue. The Labor government’s new Highways Bill calls for establishing a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) funding model (similar to what is used for various public utilities) for major highway projects. The current bill also calls for regulation of the tolls by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR). Once the bill is passed, the first project is expected to be the planned Lower Thames Crossing.
La Caisse to Sell West Connex Stake
Canadian pension fund La Caisse has contracted with Macquarie Capital to sell its stake in Australian toll road WestConnex, reported Infralogic (Sept. 27). WestConnex is reported to have $711 million in annual revenue, and it is considered to be Australia’s most valuable toll road. Besides La Caisse, other WestConnex shareholders include AustralianSuper, CPP Investments, Transurban, and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.
A Driverless 18-Wheeler
The Wall Street Journal’s Esther Fung wrote an engaging article and video on a fully autonomous 18-wheel highway truck operating on Interstates in Texas.
Recommended Reading
An excellent new book is The UPS Man: James E. Casey and the Creation of Modern Logistics. The author is Marc Levinson, well-known for The Box, the landmark book on the container shipping revolution. Former Reason Editor-in-Chief Virginia Postrel reviewed The UPS Man for The Wall Street Journal.
“The [North Carolina] I-77 South cancellation and un-cancellation is an interesting case because it reveals the rough contours of one solution to America’s permitting hold-up problem: make cancellers pay the very sunk costs they are trying to hold up. This cannot be applied to every veto point very easily, but it clearly reduces or eliminates the incentives for intervention. Moving hard veto points much earlier in the planning process is another option, albeit with tradeoffs of its own. Obviously, removing the number of veto or delay opportunities in federal and/or state law is a cleaner option than trying to curtail the obvious incentive for stakeholders to take advantage of them.”
—Michael Bennon, “A Canceller-Pays Solution to America’s Permitting Cancellation Problem,” Public Works Financing, Sept. 2026