On September 28, 2026, Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy hosted a Modern Skies press conference with, among others, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Brian Bedford and Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-MO). The press conference debuted Sen. Schmitt’s Modern Skies Act, which Sec. Duffy touted in a statement as providing “the funding we need to modernize the digital architecture powering air traffic control, replace crumbling aviation infrastructure, and build world-class airports across the country.”
The Modern Skies Act would provide $30 billion in funding across three major areas, according to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announcement:
- “$10 billion to build world-class airports” by way of a new pilot program aimed at certain medium hub airports;
- “$10 billion to complete reliable digital architecture” for air traffic control; and
- “$10 billion to overhaul outdated airport infrastructure,” including air traffic control towers.
These are ambitious and worthy goals. But does the Modern Skies Act deliver on those promises? A reading of the bill suggests the answer is “no.” To see why, we can examine the bill’s three core sections.
Section 3: Pilot Program for Modernization, Replacement, or Full Reconstruction of Aging Flagship Terminals at Transitional Hub Airports
This section of the bill provides $10 billion for a new pilot program to fund, at up to a 90% federal share, terminal projects at certain medium-hub airports. Eligibility is limited to “not more than 3 transitional hub airports for the rehabilitation and modernization of such airports.” To qualify, an airport needs to:
- Be a transitional hub (i.e., it is growing);
- Possess a primary terminal building constructed before January 1, 1990, that still serves passengers;
- Have not completed a comprehensive redevelopment or replacement of its principal commercial passenger terminal on or after January 1, 1990; and
- Have a planned rehabilitation project that is mature.
- The federal government subsidizes airports to the tune of approximately $4 billion per year under the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grant program administered by the FAA. The principal objective of this program is to help develop a nationwide system of public-use airports that meets the current needs and the projected growth of civil aviation. Under the AIP program, the highest priority goes to safety and security projects, with other major objectives including preserving existing airport infrastructure, meeting FAA standards, increasing or maintaining capacity, and mitigating noise and environmental impacts.
There are restrictions on what AIP grants can be spent on. Generally, funds are to be spent on items that fall in the categories of airport planning, airport development, and noise compatibility planning and projects. The funds are not to be spent on a variety of things associated with the terminal and other airport elements, especially those that can generate commercial revenue (e.g., concessions, parking). Airport terminal items that funds can be spent on generally are public-use spaces that passengers may need to occupy as part of their air travel.
Viewed in this context, the terminal pilot program portion of the bill proposes to spend more than twice the normal annual AIP allotment, without the AIP restrictions on what the money can be spent for, and directs it specifically to airports that have failed to maintain their terminal infrastructure. The program would be administered by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, rather than the FAA, which historically has been more inclined to politicize project selection. While the program would allow up to three airports to participate, it is not clear if any airports other than St. Louis Lambert International, in the home state of Sen. Schmitt, would actually qualify.
Section 4: Air Traffic Control Improvements
This section of the bill provides a combined $10.1 billion for air traffic control modernization. Of that total, it allocates $300 million to air traffic control facility consolidation, $600 million to implement strategic air traffic flow management technologies, $2 billion for cloud computing infrastructure, and $7.2 billion for a common automation platform and common controller workstation, which are intended to replace the FAA’s aging terminal and en route air traffic control automation systems.
Each of these allocations deserves scrutiny. The $300 million for air traffic control facility consolidation can’t be argued with, given that some consolidation of facilities should occur. The question is, what is the basis of this $300 million estimate? Have the facilities to be consolidated been identified? Probably not. Under its current political constraints, where politicians demand the FAA maintain aging and inefficient facilities in their districts, can the FAA pull this off? Also, probably not.
Turning to the $600 million for strategic air traffic flow management technologies, or SMART, recent controversy over the Trump administration’s purported interest in an equity stake in the current SMART vendor Air Space Intelligence (ASI) has overshadowed the problems with the FAA’s ongoing procurement. FAA had just awarded a contract to ASI for $875 million to implement Flow Management Data and Services (FMDS)/SMART as a combined program. As part of that program, the SMART component appears to have no firm requirements. The FAA does not have the appropriations to support this contract value, so this $600 million appears to be there to fill this gap. A back-of-the-envelope analysis of this program indicates the $875 million awarded for this contract is wildly high. The FAA should not be bailed out of this award error, but instead should be required to deal with it through normal budgeting and appropriations processes.
With respect to the $2 billion for cloud computing infrastructure, this is simply egregious. Current FAA planning puts the Common Automation Platform (CAP) program in the cloud (CAP is discussed in more detail later). This money apparently supports that goal, yet such a goal is highly dubious. The FAA has 21 Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs) and approximately 145 Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities scattered throughout the United States. Each of these facilities has a co-located automation system. This geographical distribution of processing provides system resiliency. Pieces of the network can fail without the entire network failing. Centralizing processing in the cloud subjects the system to widespread outages from cloud system failure. Cloud environments are reliable, but failures happen, and when they do, results are dramatic.
Notably, an operational air traffic control automation platform serving a significant air traffic facility has not been put in the cloud anywhere on Earth. There is one small instance—a tower system at Memmingen Airport in Germany—and there are hybrid instances, such as running certain training features in the cloud, but not an entire large operational platform. In Europe, the independent safety regulator, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), has been struggling with the problem of certifying such a system for more than six years. Problems with certification revolve around the definition of the system boundary and the tight definition of the services that surround the system boundary, which need to be controlled to support the system (including operating systems, virtual machine monitors, load balancers, etc.). Accordingly, planning cloud implementation of CAP significantly increases program risk. And given the $2 billion for cloud computing infrastructure, it also significantly increases program cost.
Finally, let’s examine the largest funding allocation: $7.2 billion for the Common Automation Platform (CAP) and common controller workstation. Certainly, replacing the current, obsolete FAA air traffic control automation system is appropriate. Existing FAA systems are 1990s technology. Commercial platforms deployed worldwide provide features that reduce controller cognitive burden and improve aviation safety. That this replacement program is a major, costly undertaking is also unquestionable. The CAP program will replace automation systems in the 20 ARTCCs and 145 TRACON facilities. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that $7.2 billion is high, but not out of the ballpark.
The problem is the lack of accounting and budgeting transparency. First, all of the FAA’s major programs require an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) to guide funding action and to provide a basis against which the performance of the program can be measured. It does not appear that CAP has one, which calls into question the cost estimate, as well as the wildly optimistic schedule that calls for initial real-world deployment in December 2028.
Second, given that this program must replace equipment in 20 ARTCCs and 145 TRACONs, the CAP program has a long duration, but it is hard to see how the FAA could finish this program in under 10 years. Consistent with normal federal budgeting rules, this would seemingly require defining program segments and funding each of these segments in the years that funds are required for a given segment. Putting the full $7.2 billion up front eliminates any potential for an orderly budget process that considers agency priorities and tradeoffs when segments come up for funding.
Section 6: Terminal Air Traffic Control and Airport Improvements
This section provides an additional $10 billion in funding, the smallest share being $2 billion for air traffic control tower modernization. The remainder is allocated to airports, with $3 billion providing supplemental appropriations to the existing AIP grant program and the creation of a new $5 billion grant program for airport terminal modernization. The bill states that both pots of funding are purely discretionary. Recall that the bulk of grants from the traditional AIP program is allocated by formula, which is intended to provide airports with predictability for multiyear planning for costly capital projects.
Conclusion
Despite the public emphasis by Secretary Duffy on air traffic control modernization, the Modern Skies Act as introduced dedicates just 40% of its $30 billion in new funding to air traffic control. The surprising winners are airports, which are facing the expiration of subsidy programs originally authorized under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021. But the creation of a new slush fund that will inevitably be politicized should be reconsidered.
While the funding for air traffic control modernization does support one necessary effort—the Common Automation Platform—taking this program outside of normal budgeting processes is not appropriate. The $2 billion for cloud computing infrastructure can be characterized as an unnecessary science project, and FAA has not shown itself up to the task of consolidating core systems into the cloud while other more technologically and institutionally advanced air traffic service providers around the world are not yet sold on the basic concept.
If Congress and White House support efficiently modernizing air traffic control, they should be disappointed by the Modern Skies Act. While a lack of consistent funding is a major problem plaguing air traffic control modernization, accountability is in even shorter supply.