Why commercial space should lead the U.S. return to the moon

Executive Summary

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) return-humans-to-the-moon program is a failure. Conceived as a modernized version of the Apollo program of 50 years ago, it is based on a massive launch vehicle (SLS), an adaptation of the Apollo capsule, and “proven” components from the failed Space Shuttle program—refurbished engines and modified solid rocket boosters. All are being delivered under sole-source, cost-plus contracts, and all are years behind schedule and tens of billions over budget. And none of the most expensive components are reusable. The program has ignored the advantages and cost savings of reusable launch systems.

A 2021 review by the NASA inspector general projected that the accumulated cost by 2025 would be $93 billion. Including the six planned SLS missions through 2031, the average cost of each would be ~$30 billion for only a handful of crew each.

This vision paper calls for the current SLS program to be canceled and replaced by a new approach that relies on state-of-the-art reusable launch vehicles, makes use of multiple launches on low-cost reusable boosters rather than a single giant vehicle, and would likely enable more moon landings sooner than is realistic via SLS and its related systems. The new approach could be funded by savings from the cancellation of most or all of the SLS components. Projected savings would be about $4.25 billion per year if the Gateway lunar satellite remains in the program or $5.25 billion per year if Gateway is also canceled.

This vision paper calls for rethinking the case for getting humans to the moon. As with Apollo’s premise of beating the Soviet Union to the moon, today, there is considerable support in the White House and Congress to beat China to the moon. If doing this is seen as essential, replacing NASA’s hugely costly, chronically late approach is vital.

Another historical reason for the SLS program was to maintain a large workforce at NASA centers in key states as well as large workforces at major aerospace contractor facilities. But given the massive cost overruns and missed deadlines in the SLS program, this rationale should no longer drive space policy. NASA would continue to oversee and foster space science and technology development, but it would not be the entity developing the launch vehicles. It would be far better to deploy those workforces to things that the commercial sector cannot do.

The keys to a cost-effective moon landing program are competition and reusability. NASA should adapt the public-private partnership approach that it has used successfully for cargo and crew delivery to and from the International Space Station. There should be no more cost-plus contracts. Potential partly or fully reusable launch vehicles include Blue Origin’s New Glenn, ULA’s Vulcan, and SpaceX’s Falcon 9, Falcon Heavy, and likely soon, Starship.

Instead of relying on one giant, expensive, and rarely flown launch vehicle, each moon journey would use multiple launches of fuel and equipment to be assembled in orbit for the trip to and from the moon. Potential landers include the already-planned Blue Moon and Starship HLS. An alternative to NASA’s troubled Orion could be a version of the SpaceX Crew Dragon. But the alternative architectures needed to expedite a return to the moon will require acceptance of risk at the same level as Apollo, and that the Chinese accept today.

NASA needs to bite the bullet and end its use of obsolete, non-reusable launch vehicles and sole-source, cost-plus contracts. It should shift to state-of-the-art reusable spacecraft and public-private partnerships like those now transporting cargo and people between Earth and the International Space Station.

The estimated annual savings from terminating the current program are as follows:

SLS launch vehicle $2.0 billion

Orion capsule $1.4 billion

Upper stage (EUS) $0.6 billion

New launch tower $0.25 billion

Gateway $1.0 billion

Total Estimate Annual Savings: $5.25 billion

The more than $5 billion annual savings from terminating the current SLS program should be ample to fund a revamped program that accomplishes the goal, shared by the White House and Congress, of returning humans to the moon before the Chinese government does.

The White House draft NASA budget, released in early May 2025, calls for terminating the SLS program after the second and third SLS launches. That plan would terminate SLS, Orion, upper stage, new launch tower, and Gateway. This would save tens of billions in future SLS missions, but would unfortunately delay the $5 billion per year cost savings needed to finance the replacement commercial space alternative. It would also potentially result in an SLS program dragged out by a demoralized staff, rather than allowing the staff to transition to something more productive. A better approach is to end the program now.