Peter Wallison has a fantastic commentary in The Wall Street Journal today looking at where the process of altering financial services regulations stands. His basic criticism is that nothing positive can move forward until the proposed rule changes are based in an analysis of what actually happened. Here he takes on the proposed resolution authority:
Then there is the proposal to give a government agency the authority to take over and “resolve” failing financial firms. Here, the administration has pointed to the chaos that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. To prevent that kind of breakdown, the administration says all large and “interconnected” financial firms in crisis should be dealt with by a government agency, rather than by a judge in bankruptcy proceedings.
The term “interconnected” is important here. It implies that when one large firm fails it will carry others down with it, causing a systemic crisis. But that is clearly not the lesson of Lehman. Although the company went suddenly and shockingly into bankruptcy, none of its large financial counterparties failed. The systemic significance of “interconnectedness” proved to be a myth.
To be sure, there was a freeze-up in lending after Lehman. But that episode demonstrated the power of moral hazard—the tendency of government action to distort private decision-making. After Bear Stearns was rescued by the Fed in March 2008, market participants assumed that all companies larger than Bear would be rescued in the future. As a result, they did not take the steps to protect themselves against counterparty failure that would have been prudent in a panicky market. When Lehman was not rescued, all market participants immediately had to review the credit standing of their counterparties. No wonder lending temporarily froze.
See the whole piece here.