Todd Zywicki writes today in the WSJ:
Fresh off of its enactment this summer of new regulations on consumer credit card terms, some in Congress want to go further—to impose a national usury ceiling on credit card interest rates and limits on interchange fees (the price that credit card issuers charge to merchants that accept their cards). That caps on interest rates harm consumers is well understood. But price controls on interchange fees would also result in consumers paying more and getting less. [...]
What would happen if the Merchants Payments Coalition gets its way and politicians squeeze interchange fees? Credit cards are essentially a closed economic system: A reduction in interchange fees will have to be offset by increased revenues elsewhere or a reduction in costs. For example, issuers could try to increase the revenue generated from consumers through higher interest payments, higher penalty fees, or reinstating annual fees.
Card issuers might also reduce the quantity and quality of credit cards by restricting credit availability and cutting back on product innovation or ancillary card benefits. This is exactly what happened when Australian regulators imposed price controls on interchange fees in 2003: Annual fees increased an average of 22% on standard credit cards and annual fees for rewards cards increased by 47%-77%. Card issuers also reduced the generosity of their reward programs by 23%. Innovation, especially in terms of improved security and identity-theft protection, was stalled. Card issuers also increased their efforts to attract higher-risk customers who generate interest and penalty fees to offset lower interchange revenues from lower-risk transactional users.
Read the whole piece here.