Reason Foundation - Authors > Harry W. Richardson

The Case Against Electric Vehicle Mandates in California

info@reason.org (Peter Gordon) info@reason.org (Harry W. Richardson) — Mon, 01 May 1995 00:00:00 EDT

Executive Summary

Air quality has been improving in Los Angeles since 1966 in spite of brisk population growth (and much faster growth of the vehicle fleet and vehicle miles traveled). Yet, air quality standards have not yet been met; new proposals to meet Clean Air Act standards include mandated electric vehicle (EV) sales in California. Proponents have suggested that the mandate also serves long-term economic growth objectives for the region.

A survey of the literature reveals substantial evidence that the EV mandate is not costeffective; the air quality goals can be met at substantially lower cost. Resources for the Future, for example, shows that in terms of $/ton of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) reduced, reformulated gasoline or emissions-based vehicle registration fees are twenty times as cost-effective as EVs. In addition, there are many reasons to expect that the macroeconomic consequences of the EV mandate will be depressive rather than stimulative.

EVs will be expensive, yet short on what consumers prize most: range and power (witness the recent surge of “utility” vehicle sales). Massive subsidies and/or cost-shifts would be required that would have depressive effects on the California economy (including higher energy costs statewide). Taxpayers and/or utility ratepayers would also have to pay for new refueling infrastructure. In addition, it is not clear that EV maintenance costs will be below that of conventional autos. If consumers avoid EVs for any of these reasons, and keep their old cars longer, air quality gains will be lost.

The Counterplan for Transportation in Southern California

info@reason.org (Peter Gordon) info@reason.org (Harry W. Richardson) — Tue, 01 Feb 1994 00:00:00 EST

Executive Summary

The 30-year transportation plan of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority is out of touch with the realities of transportation in Southern California. This region is characterized by low population density and the decentralization of jobs via continued suburbanization. These factors have led to continued growth in auto use and decline in the use of public transit.

Rail transit is the wrong kind of transportation for this region. Other cities that have tried adding rail transit have failed to increase transit's mode share, despite the expenditure of billions of dollars (and frequent infliction of harm on the pre-existing bus system). The same pattern is beginning to be evident in greater Los Angeles. Our first new rail line, the Blue Line, has a taxpayer cost of $21 per rider per day. Since few of its riders are former drivers (as opposed to bus users), the system costs taxpayers $37,489 per year for every car it removes from the freeways.

The key to solving L.A.s' transportation problem is to go with the flow rather than fighting it; i.e., to develop a transportation system consistent with our chosen land-use patterns. The key to doing this is to achieve higher vehicle occupancy on our streets and freeways. That means encouraging new forms of door-to-door transit via a three-part program: 1) create an expanded network of transitways, to permit meaningful time savings for eligible vehicles; 2) deregulate van, taxi, and jitney services to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship in creating these new modes; and 3) introduce peak-hour pricing on freeways, beginning with High Occupancy/Toll lanes.

In parallel with these three policy changes, those new rail lines that are not already fully committed should be canceled, permitting major savings in both capital costs and operating subsidies. In addition, the Metrolink commuter rail services should be canceled, with express bus and van services meeting the needs of those commuters.

The net effect of these policy changes would be significantly higher average vehicle occupancy, higher average speeds and reduced traffic congestion, greater transit use than under current rail-based plans, reduced air pollution, and over 125,000 new jobs in new transit firms (many of which would be entrepreneurial opportunities).

The net savings to taxpayers over the next 40 years from implementing this Counterplan would be more than $123 billion.

The Facts About Gridlock in Southern California

info@reason.org (Peter Gordon) info@reason.org (Harry W. Richardson) — Sun, 01 Aug 1993 00:00:00 EDT

Executive Summary

Traffic congestion is considered one of Southern California's most serious problems, yet much of what people believe about traffic, especially rush-hour commuting, is wrong. Up-to-date data from the 1990 Census and Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey provide a sound basis for rethinking our approach to transportation planning in the greater Los Angeles region.

Despite concern over congestion, the fraction of commuters choosing to drive to work alone actually increased during the 1980s—from 70.5 percent to 72.3 percent of all worktrips. Carpooling and transit each attracted a smaller share in 1990 than in 1980. By 1990 more people walked to work or rode bicycles or motorcycles than used public transit services. As of 1990, transit accounted for only 4.5 percent of all worktrips.

Although greater Los Angeles is generally considered the nation's most congested metro area, it compares surprisingly well to the other top-10 metro areas in both trip speeds and commuting times. Los Angeles is fifth highest among the top 10 in commuting speed, and it ranks even better for shopping and personal-trip speeds. Moreover, average commuting times have remained surprisingly constant over the past 20 years, at around 24 to 25 minutes. Continuing suburbanization has brought many jobs to the suburbs, and people have also moved closer to work. These locational adjustments have kept speeds and trip times from deteriorating.

Despite congestion, Southern Californians are making a lot more trips than 10 or 20 years ago, in part because of a strong increase in women's travels, both worktrips and (especially) family related and personal trips. The large majority of all trips are nonworktrips. Surprisingly, nonworktrips make up a considerable share even of rush-hour travel. After factoring out “chained” trips (worktrips that include a stop along the way for shopping, daycare, and the like), truly nonworktrips constitute 43 percent of the morning rush hour in greater Los Angeles and 56 percent of the afternoon rush hour.

These facts suggest that transportation planners need to rethink many of their assumptions. Disproportionate emphasis is being placed on worktrip reduction (e.g., mandatory employer-based ridesharing under Regulation XV) and on fixed-rail transit. More promising efforts include highoccupancy vehicle lanes, expanded opportunities for taxis and van services, and increased telecommuting.