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Treating Wall Street Like the Mafia

anthony.randazzo@reason.org (Anthony Randazzo) — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 13:53:00 EST

Perhaps Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) thinks of himself as a modern day John Sherman. In 1890, Ohio Sen. Sherman set out on a mission to establish “just competition” laws and level the economic playing field. His quest culminated in the dismantling of monopolies—such as American Tobacco and Standard Oil—and the passage of new laws prohibiting malicious competitive practices. In a similar way, Dodd now seeks the power to tear apart any company he considers a risk to the national economy. But unlike Sherman, Dodd isn’t out to create the best possible conditions for competition to thrive. He’s out for blood.

Dodd’s plan for overhauling Wall Street regulations, released last week, includes a proposed new organization: the Agency for Financial Stability (AFS). This new regulator would be tasked with identifying and addressing “systemic risks posed by large, complex companies as well as products and activities that can spread risk across firms.” This represents one piece of the most extensive proposal to reform financial services regulation—topping even the ridiculousness of the Obama plan and Barney Frank plan. Which is saying a lot.

The financial crisis has made off with nearly $30 trillion in global wealth. Dodd believes Wall Street banks and other financial institutions are the chief culprits in this dubious economic caper. And to exact revenge, he will push for some of the toughest, most expansive regulatory powers to date.

To do this, Dodd plans to go Elliot Ness on Wall Street, using economists and accountants as if they were FBI agents. Only instead of targeting Al Capone and Big Angelo Lonardo, these number-crunchers would be given nearly limitless power to hunt down systemic risks inside America’s financial institutions.

Here’s one of the biggest problems with this (and with the Obama and Frank plans, too): the government offers only a dangerously vague definition of what constitutes a financial institution. So not only would Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase qualify, but firms like Wal-Mart, Ford, and Texas Instruments—not exactly the companies you think of when discussing Wall Street regulation—might be subject to higher compliance standards as well. It all depends on the subjective whims of the Agency for Financial Stability.

As outlined in the Dodd plan, AFS would be an independent agency, one whose chairman was appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. It would also have a 9-member board comprised of federal financial regulators and an independent expert.

The structure is similar to President Obama’s proposed Financial Services Oversight Council. Both of these proposed overseers would monitor the market for systemic risks, and would possess the authority to collect information from financial institutions as needed. The major difference is that where the Obama council would only have the power to designate firms as “Tier 1” companies, a category that would require stricter regulation, Dodd’s agency would actually have the power to break-up those companies considered too big to fail.

In other words, an Agency for Financial Stability would enjoy unprecedented power over the private sector. Presently, if the government wants to take a large firm apart, it must first take its case to court, proving that the company is either a monopoly or that it is maliciously attacking its competitors.

Yet not only would Dodd’s AFS write rules for capital requirements, leverage limiting, and risk management compliance, it would also have the authority to treat Wells Fargo or UBS like the Bonanno crime family.

Which means that the risk of undue political influence is palpable. Let say’s enough people come to believe that Goldman Sachs is secretly controlling the Treasury Department, as Rolling Stone’s Matt Taibbi so viciously claimed. All those people need to do is pressure the government into taking the company apart on the grounds that it’s size has become too critical to the economic health of the nation. There are certainly enough anti-Goldman Sachs staffers on Capitol Hill to make that happen. And it doesn’t take a follower of Ayn Rand to imagine a scenario where flimsy justifications like “to expand competition” and “create a fair playing field” start rolling off the tongues of aggressive AFS agents.

Nor is the Agency for Financial Stability the only part of the Dodd plan worth worrying about. His regulatory overhaul proposal also includes a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, similar to the one currently being considered in the House. Even more aggressive than Rep. Frank’s version, this consumer agency would also ultimately protect the market to death.

The Wall Street Journal pointed out last week that the Dodd overhaul plan would open up anyone who associates with someone accused of fraud to civil suits, even if prosecutors have no proof or are just on a fishing expedition. The Dodd proposal also repeats the errors of the Obama plan on issues like derivative reform, hedge funds, and executive compensation.

There are a few good ideas in the proposal. Consolidating federal banking rules into a single regulator could do a lot to simplify and refocus banking rules. Though that reform shouldn’t be kept separate from consumer protection concerns, and it would be inappropriate for the regulator to force the various charters under its supervision into one-size-fits-all regulations.

The Dodd plan also requires large firms to provide “funeral plans” outlining how they could be quickly and effectively shutdown in the case of an emergency. In theory, this is just a part of responsible risk management. But the Dodd plan treads into dangerous waters by giving AFS the authority to approve or reject such plans.

In the end, the Dodd plan is on the highest order of hubris. Politicians in Washington honestly believe they can fix the economy and prevent future calamity. Sure, they weren’t quite right when they “fixed” the system after Enron, or when they “reformed” the rules under Clinton, or when they “fixed” everything after the Savings and Loan Crisis. But this time will be different! At least Elliot Ness knew enough to change tactics after several initial failures to capture Al Capone.

The current financial crisis was largely brought about by well-intentioned regulations that just got it wrong. We thought that 8 percent was enough capital for banks to hold onto in case they ran into trouble. We thought that subprime mortgage-backed securities were decreasing risk. We were wrong on both counts. We can’t anticipate every risk. Under the Dodd plan—like the Obama and Frank plans before it— we’ll be proven wrong once again.

Anthony Randazzo is a policy analyst for Reason Foundation. This column first appeared at Reason.com.

Worse Than Taxes

info@reason.org (John Stossel) — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 13:49:00 EST

Bill O'Reilly is mad at me because I'm not mad enough about taxes.

Last week on The O'Reilly Factor, we talked about California's and New York's enormous budget deficits and planned tax increases. Those states would have big surpluses had they just grown their governments in pace with inflation. But of course they didn't. Now the politicians act like their current deficits are something imposed on them by the recession.

But that's nonsense. They created the problem with their reckless spending.

Let's look at the particulars. Had the government of New York state grown at the rate of population and inflation over the past 10 years, it would have a $14 billion surplus today. Instead, spending grew at twice the rate of inflation. So New York has a $3 billion deficit.

To dent California's deficit, bureaucrats will withhold an extra 10 percent from every taxpayer—at least from those who don't flee the state. New York planned to raise the price of new license plates, but then backed off. The visible tax was unpopular. But the hidden taxes grow.

Hidden taxes are more pernicious because they disguise what we pay for government. We blame merchants, not our legislators, for the high price of gasoline, liquor, cigarettes, and phone calls, but the money goes to the political thieves.

New York imposes a gas tax of 61 cents a gallon—almost a quarter of the cost of the gas. New York City taxes cigarettes at $4.25 a pack. Washington state collects $26 per gallon of hard liquor. Illinois politicians take a sneaky cut when you buy junk food: They add 6.25 percent to the cost of soda and candy.

My phone bill lists seven different taxes—unintelligible stuff like a "Public Safety Commission Surcharge" and an "MCTD tax." The payroll tax is one of the biggest hidden taxes. You assume that you know what you pay because it's listed on your paycheck, but that's actually only half of it. Employers must pay an equal amount—money that otherwise would have been part your salary.

O'Reilly was most indignant about the visible taxes. "You, Stossel, are going to be paying 45 percent of your money to the government!" he said. I replied that I already pay more than that, since I live in New York City.

But I apparently was not indignant enough, because later in his show he told comedian Dennis Miller, "Stossel doesn't get it."

O'Reilly is right about my not being furious. It's not that taxes don't anger me. They do. But I'm more angry about the arrogance of the ruling class. It reminds me of Walter Williams' riff: "Politicians are worse than thieves. At least when thieves take your money, they don't expect you to thank them for it."

Taxes, even counting hidden taxes, are not the real measure of what the thieves take. The true burden of government, the late Milton Friedman said, is the spending level. Taxation is just one way government gets money. The other ways—borrowing and inflation—are equally burdens on the people. (State governments can't inflate, but they sure can borrow.)

O'Reilly told me that America is ready for a tax revolt. I hope he's right. But I don't think it will happen until more people see the ruling elite for what it is: a gang of arrogant bullies that has the audacity to believe that they know how to direct our lives better than we do.

That's why, bad as the taxes are, I'm more upset about ObamaCare, Medicare, the "stimulus," the auto bailout, the bank bailouts, the Fannie/Freddie bailouts, the trillions in guarantees, and on and on.

The politicians' spending schemes represent presumptuous interference in our lives. They are an assault on our autonomy.

John Stossel will soon host Stossel on the Fox Business Network. He's the author of Give Me a Break and of Myth, Lies, and Downright Stupidity. This column first appeared at Reason.com.

Bernanke's Philosopher

info@reason.org (Penn Bullock) — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 15:17:00 EST

When Ben Bernanke took charge of the Federal Reserve in 2006, the media made a few passing references that suggested he secretly subscribed to libertarianism. “I worked with him for years before I even knew he was a libertarian-leaning Republican,” the former Fed vice chairman Alan Blinder told CNN. The Wall Street Journal reported that Bernanke, “though a libertarian Republican …displays few partisan leanings.”

Last summer President Barack Obama re-nominated Bernanke to another four-year term atop the central bank, a reward for allegedly saving the world from a second Great Depression. Bernanke will arrive at his Senate confirmation hearings this January with an unbeatable recommendation. “As an expert on the causes of the Great Depression,” Obama raved in August, “I’m sure Ben never imagined that he would be part of a team responsible for preventing another. But because of his background, his temperament, his courage and his creativity, that’s exactly what he has helped to achieve.”

“Mission Accomplished,” the banner might have read.

Missing from Obama’s speech was any mention of Bernanke’s economic philosophy. These days, the media have taken to calling him a Keynesian—a believer in fiscal stimulus and the mixed economy. “We are all Keynesians again,” the liberal Washington Monthly headlined a January 2009 feature on the Fed chief.

In reality, Bernanke is following a monetarist depression-prevention model laid out by Nobel laureate and libertarian patron saint Milton Friedman. The Fed chairman has invoked the late economist in support of lowering interest rates to zero and bailing out banks. Trillions of dollars have been staked on the insights of “monetarism,” the economic theory of central banking and inflation-management associated with Friedman and Anna Schwartz. Though Schwartz now distances herself from Bernanke, opposing his reappointment on the grounds that he’s gone too far, the irony remains that a series of Fed policies many libertarians find repugnant are being championed by a man claiming to take his chief inspiration from the most influential libertarian economist of the 20th century.

A Monetary History of Ben Bernanke

The story begins in 1963, when Friedman and co-author Anna Schwartz published A Monetary History of the United States, an opening salvo in what Friedman called a “counterrevolution” against Keynesian theory. Their chapter on the Great Depression was spun off into a stand-alone book, The Great Contraction: 1929–1933, an epic revisionist history that changed America’s understanding of the causes of the Depression. Friedman and Schwartz contended that the Federal Reserve—not capitalism or Wall Street—was to blame for the dismal ’30s.

“The fact of the matter is that it was the [Fed’s] decision to tighten credit policy in 1928 that produced the Great Contraction,” the 93-year-old Schwartz says by phone from her office at the National Bureau of Economic Research in New York City. The Fed hiked interest rates in 1928 to curb what it saw as rampant speculation on Wall Street—a conflagration of leverage, margin buying, and outright Ponzi scheming fueled in the first instance by cheap credit from the Federal Reserve. (Goldman Sachs’ various pyramid schemes from that era, after they collapsed in 1929, generated losses of $475 billion in today’s dollars.)

Friedman and Schwartz rejected the widely held theory that speculation had been a major problem, or that there had even been a credit bubble in the 1920s. Bad loans and reckless banking practices were a “minor factor,” at most, in the Great Depression, they said. In this narrative, a Federal Reserve paranoid about speculation had needlessly constricted the money supply, imploding an otherwise sound economy.

After the Great Crash of 1929, the Federal Reserve drastically cut interest rates from a brief high of 6 percent to 1.5 percent by mid-1931. But during the first few years of the crisis, the Fed occasionally felt forced to abruptly raise rates again in complicated maneuvers to stem outflows of gold into Europe. Friedman and Schwartz blamed these sporadic interest rate hikes for smothering incipient recoveries, opening a vortex of deflation, and transforming a recession into the Great Depression.

“What the Fed had to do was increase the money supply,” Schwartz tells me. “By taking that action, it would have revived the economy. That’s the lesson of the Great Depression.” In The Great Contraction, she and Friedman argued that the Fed squandered its ample latitude to combat deflation. “The monetary authorities,” they wrote, “could have prevented the decline in the stock of money—indeed, could have produced almost any desired increase in the money stock.”

When it comes to his academic specialty, Bernanke is a disciple of Friedman and Schwartz. In 2002, at Friedman’s 90th birthday party at the University of Chicago, Bernanke was effusive. “Among economic scholars,” he began, “Friedman has no peers.” He developed the “leading and most persuasive” explanation of the Depression, whose impact on economics and the popular mind “cannot be overstated.”

At the end of his encomium, Bernanke made a soon-to-be-famous apology on behalf of the Federal Reserve, where he was then president of the powerful New York branch: “I would like to say to Milton and Anna…regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.” (The speech was published as the afterword to the latest edition of The Great Contraction.)

Schwartz was present at the birthday party. “I’m sure he was sincere when he said that,” she says. And Bernanke stayed true to his word. In 2006 he replaced Alan Greenspan as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Greenspan, a self-described “libertarian Republican” who had once been part of Ayn Rand’s inner circle, had engineered an era of low-inflation growth that won Friedman’s endorsement. “There is no other period of comparable length in which the Federal Reserve System has performed so well,” Friedman declared in The Wall Street Journal on January 31, 2006.

Monetarism and Freedom

When the economy collapsed two years into Bernanke’s watch because of a massive credit bubble, he slashed interest rates to zero and ordered the money-printing presses to full steam. He also embarked on a course of “quantitative easing,” where a central bank convolutedly buys its own government’s bonds with printed money so as to sink interest rates even further.

This approach was not new. Friedman had prescribed quantitative easing, combined with “easy money” and inflation, as a cure for Japan’s 1990s economic slump, which he described as an “eerie, if less dramatic, replay of the Great Contraction.” As he did with the Depression-era Fed, Friedman emphasized that “there is no limit to the extent to which the Bank of Japan can increase the money supply if it wishes to do so.” In 1998, a year after Friedman penned his advice in The Wall Street Journal, Japan introduced monetary stimulus: a cocktail of zero interest rates and quantitative easing. But deflation continued. Today Japan’s exports are down an unthinkable 36 percent from just last year, and prices are plummeting at an all-time record pace.

Stateside, in the shadow of the Fed’s multi-trillion-dollar balance sheet, it has been all too easy to categorize Bernanke simply as a Keynesian supporter of public works projects, socialistic safety nets, and profligate, government-led consumption. While it’s true that the Obama ad-ministration is pursuing Keynesian fiscal stimulus, the Federal Reserve under Bernanke has consciously acted on the Friedman/Schwartz insight that loosening central bank credit is a fundamental tool in forestalling deflation and depression. Understanding that monetarism can mean both the management of low inflation in good times, and the creation of inflation in bad times, has proven too difficult for most of the media.

The New York Times, for instance, has identified Bernanke as “a student if not necessarily a devotee of the British economist John Maynard Keynes.” Actually, Bernanke spent most of his academic career elaborating on Friedman’s Keynes-refuting interpretation of the Great Depression. Athough his research sometimes strayed into nonmonetary subjects, it was always, as he said at Friedman’s birthday party, “an embellishment of the Friedman-Schwartz story…and in no way contradict[ed] the basic logic of their analysis.” In 2003, at a conference honoring Friedman’s Free to Choose, Bernanke said, “Friedman’s monetary framework has been so influential that, in its broad outlines at least, it has nearly become identical with modern monetary theory and practice.” So great was Friedman’s influence that Bernanke compared it with Shakespeare’s contributions to English literature.

Even Bernanke’s nickname “Helicopter Ben” derives directly from Milton Friedman. It came about during a 2002 speech entitled “Deflation: Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t Happen Here,” in which he quoted Friedman on the importance of conjoining fiscal and monetary policies. The ideal fiscal stimulus, Bernanke said, was a shower of tax cuts “equivalent to Milton Friedman’s famous ‘helicopter drop’ of money.” Friedman had originally used the phrase to counter Keynes’ idea of the “liquidity trap,” in which setting interest rates at zero leads to bank hoarding and leaves the Federal Reserve no room to maneuver. Friedman suggested that countries could escape the liquidity trap by handing out money to consumers, and he explained his argument in a tale about a helicopter unloading cash on a town. Likewise, Bernanke’s Federal Reserve has created special “vehicles” to disburse consumer credit from on high.

In February, Bloomberg News added to the philosophical confusion by reporting that “Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is siding with John Maynard Keynes against Milton Friedman by flooding the financial system with money.” Of course, Bernanke has said precisely the opposite. He’s flooding the financial system with money during a deflationary crisis, he says, because that’s what Friedman would have him do.

On February 10, Bernanke further underscored his allegiance to Friedman in an overlooked Capitol Hill question-and-answer session with Rep. Ron Paul (R-Texas). Their exchange is worth quoting at length.

“Chairman,” Paul began, “you have written a lot about the Depression. There was a famous quote you made once to Milton Friedman, apologizing for the Federal Reserve bringing on the Depression. But you assured him it wouldn’t happen again.…But the key to this discussion has to be: Was it too much credit in the ’20s that created the conditions that demanded a recession/depression, or was it lack of credit in the Depression that caused the prolongation?…Here we’re working frantically to keep prices up. What’s wrong with allowing the market to dictate this…and prices to go down quickly so we can all go back to work again?”

In response, Bernanke repeated the lesson of The Great Contraction: “Milton Friedman’s view was that the cause of the Great Depression was the failure of the Federal Reserve to avoid excessively tight monetary policy in the early ’30s. That was Friedman and Schwartz’s famous book. With that lesson in mind, the Federal Reserve has reacted very aggressively to cut interest rates in this current crisis. Moreover, we’ve tried to avoid the collapse of the banking system.”

For her part, Schwartz is critical of Bernanke’s application of her and Friedman’s theories. “You don’t have to lower the interest rates to the extent that he has in order to increase the money supply,” she says. “The essential action should be increasing the money supply. That’s the lesson of the Great Depression.” She adds, “There’s nothing contradictory in The Great Contraction with reference to what the Fed should be doing currently.”

Schwartz is alarmed by the enthusiasm with which Bernanke has put “monetary expansion” into practice. She berates the Fed for going too far and predicts that it will have to raise interest rates “in the near future” to arrest inflation. Asked if she sees hyperinflation on the horizon, she exclaims, “Oh, yes!”

In a New York Times op-ed last July, Schwartz criticized Bernanke as a “man without a plan,” warning that his “easy monetary policy is a sin.” She concluded, “He does not deserve reappointment.”

Schwartz also seems to have undergone a late-life conversion to at least some part of Keynesian theory. Asked for her current solution to the crisis, she repeats the ultimate Keynesian maxim: The government should pick up slackening demand in the private sector.

“People are saving, not spending. In order to revive this economy,” she says, hesitating before continuing, “the government will have to resume spending. By spending, the government will require that the current inventory will be depleted and have to be replenished. And that will bring on additional production and jobs.”

Bernanke’s Money Mischief

Ron Paul, like Schwartz and Friedman, is a libertarian, but he embraces the “Austrian” school of economic theory that rejects the very concept of the Federal Reserve. He is critical of what he sees as the Fed’s ongoing monetarism. “In essence,” Paul says in a phone interview, “Bernanke is following Friedman’s advice. He’s a Friedmanite when it comes to massively inflating. Bernanke was able to justify [his policies] by using Friedman.”

Does Friedman’s enthusiasm for inflating the monetary supply in crises flout libertarianism? “Absolutely,” Paul answers. “The monetarists said that you could overcome a natural market correction of a collapsing system by inflation—print money faster! Which contradicts Friedman’s whole thesis. He wanted a steady, managed increase in the supply of money of about 3 percent.” Here Paul is alluding to Money Mischief, Friedman’s 1991 book in which he called on the Fed to grow the money supply at 3 percent annually, presumably forever. “Yet at the same time, Friedman said the Depression could have been prevented by massively inflating.” Paul has kind words for Friedman, whom he praises as a staunch defender of economic liberty, but his final summation is damning: “Friedman’s very, very libertarian—except on monetary issues.”

With Bernanke at the helm, the Federal Reserve has unleashed monetary expansion, the very definition of inflation—and Friedman’s blueprint for averting economic depression. According to Bernanke, Obama, and scores of economists, it’s working. “Prospects for a return to growth in the near term appear good,” Bernanke predicted in August.

But with lenders foreclosing on 358,000 homes that month, the commercial real estate market only beginning to collapse, a 20 percent annual fall in railroad freight, and unemployment projected to crack double digits any minute now, the much-vaunted recovery is no given. And if it isn’t working, we might still relapse into recession, or worse.

The total cost of the Fed’s monetarist-inspired program is mysterious. Paul, whose bill to audit the Fed is now co-sponsored by more than half of the House of Representatives, declares: “We don’t know for sure how much the Fed has spent—I’ve heard it could be $6 trillion. But we have no knowledge of what the Fed’s doing. All these dealings are very secret.” A Reuters estimate in late September pegged the Fed’s balance sheet around $2.1 trillion, with $111 billion doled out to banks every day through the Fed’s overnight discount window. Bloomberg News has sued the Federal Reserve for full disclosure, and we may soon find out the exact number. Manhattan Chief U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska has ordered the Federal Reserve to open its books, though the bank has filed an appeal.

Friedman and Schwartz, those champions of low inflation, have helped inspire the greatest monetary expansion in Federal Reserve history, a program of limitless market interventions and tireless money printing whose end game is likely to be a return to the bad old days of inflation that they fought for so long. For two libertarian champions of free markets and limited government, this unintended legacy has the ring of a world-historic irony.

Penn Bullock (penneth@gmail.com) is a freelance writer for Village Voice Media. He lives in Florida. This column first appeared at Reason.com.

Where's That Inflation?

vdereugy@gmu.edu (Veronique de Rugy) — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 14:54:00 EST

From September 2008 to September 2009, the Federal Reserve pumped an unprecedented $2 trillion into the financial system by buying Treasury bonds and assets from banks. According to most mainstream economists, such action should create a general increase in prices.

Inflation is the result of more dollars chasing the same number of (or fewer) goods. As the Nobel laureate Milton Friedman put it, in one of his main contributions to “monetarist” economics, inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon—that is, it’s caused by an expansion in the supply of money or credit. So why haven’t we seen inflation in 2009? Are we looking in the wrong places, or is it time to update monetarist theory?

The monetary base, which consists of currency in circulation plus bank reserves on deposit with the Federal Reserve, has exploded, as Figure 1 shows. Figure 2, by contrast, shows inflation as gauged by the consumer price index (CPI)—the cost of goods purchased by the average U.S. household—and by a measure called the median CPI. Standard CPI is the traditional measure for inflation, but a few extreme outliers (such as the price of fuel) can throw off the average; thus the median is a more robust statistic to estimate the central tendency in the data.

So while the standard CPI shows deflation over the past year, that stems from a few anomalous sectors, such as energy, where prices have dipped significantly since 2008. The median CPI, on the other hand, shows an inflation rate that does not look very unusual.

The standard explanation for the lack of inflation is that banks are sitting on all that new cash. As soon as the economy shows signs of recovery, goes the theory, banks will make more loans, and the broader monetary aggregates will shoot up rapidly. But that expectation ignores an important factor: Beginning in October 2008, for the first time in history, the Federal Reserve started paying interest on reserves held by banks. So even when the economy starts heating up, banks will have an incentive to hold money rather than lend it.

What’s more, should inflation rear its head anytime soon, the Fed could suck the newly created money out of the banking system by selling assets, such as some of the higher-quality mortgage-backed securities it bought from banks at the depth of the financial crisis. That would decrease the amount of money in the system and choke back inflation.

On top of that, the Georgetown University economist Donald Marron has argued, if investors really thought we were on the verge of inflation, we would see the 10-year Treasury or 30-year mortgage rates go through the roof. But that hasn’t happened.

Marron’s view reflects what might be called the monetarist consensus. It is embraced by economists across the political spectrum, including Obama’s economic adviser Larry Summers and the current and former Fed chairmen. It is a position that relies on the wisdom of politically independent (and hopefully monetarist) central bankers to manage both the economy and the threat of inflation.

Besides placing undue faith in the Fed’s ability to time perfectly any necessary anti-inflationary measures, the consensus suggests that the nation’s central bank now has the heretofore undiscovered ability to increase the money supply without creating inflation. If true, this would be an important new development, since inflation has long been rightly vilified for destroying entrepreneurship and long-term economic growth. But if false, this conceit could prove dangerous indeed. And it’s probably false.

On his blog Free Advice in September, the Pacific Research Institute economist Robert Murphy argued that inflation is already here but economists are missing the signs. “From [December 2008] until August 2009, the unadjusted CPI level has increased 2.7%, which translates to an annualized increase of just over 4%,” Murphy wrote. He acknowledged that “ten-year yields [on Treasury bonds] are…low” but added that the price of gold has increased enormously. “Why do we assume that TIPS [Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities] traders are genius forecasters, but gold traders are morons?” he asked.

In an email message, Murphy adds: “I believe we are currently witnessing a bubble in Treasury debt. I consider the current yields on 10-year U.S. government bonds to be absurdly low, just like the price of housing was absurdly high in early 2006. After this bubble bursts, investors will slap themselves on the forehead and say, ‘What were we thinking? Why did we rush into Treasurys even as the government told us it was planning to double the federal debt burden in a decade?’ ”

The St. Lawrence University economist Steven Horwitz agrees both that inflation is already happening and that it is widely misunderstood. Monetarists, he says, were “too focused on aggregates like ‘the’ price level, which led economists to ignore the way inflation could distort individual prices at the microeconomic level, causing resource misallocation in the process.” Virtually all economists now agree, for example, that the Fed’s low interest rates inflated housing prices earlier in the decade. Yet as the prices of houses went up, few economists worried about inflation because the CPI looked relatively stable, due in part to a decrease in energy prices. When housing started to crash in 2007, many economists thought the Fed should inject still more funds into the system to stave off further declines. They failed to see that the Fed had distorted relative prices in the first place.

As the George Mason University economist Peter Boettke explains, “A problem with the current monetarists is that while they learned from Friedman the idea that we should fight inflation, in practice they learned from his writings on the Great Depression that central banks should fear deflation.” As a result, economists who are theoretically inflation-hating Friedmanites now want to meet every downturn by fighting deflation.

Because of this tendency, bursting government-created bubbles leads to the creation of new ones. The real lesson may be that inflation is not only a monetary phenomenon but also a political one. Which makes it that much more difficult to predict, much less control.

Contributing Editor Veronique de Rugy (vderugy@gmu.edu) is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. This column first appeared at Reason.com.

New at Reason: Louisiana Provides Model for Closing Budget Deficit

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 12:36:00 EST

Our friends at the Goldwater Institute published a new article of mine today pointing to Louisiana's government reform and streamlining efforts as a model for Arizona policymakers to emulate as they grapple with billions in projected deficits over the next several years. Of course, the same lessons would translate to the dozens of other states also facing severe fiscal crises:

Arizona policymakers need to accept the reality that there's no way to avoid government downsizing. The state is now second to only California in the severity of its fiscal crisis and faces over $5 billion in additional budget deficits through 2011. Yet, our officials remain distracted by Sacramento-style accounting gimmicks and a proposed sales tax hike that wouldn't come close to closing the gap. Worse, many policymakers seem more concerned with preserving agency largesse than trying to eliminate it.

Contrast this with Louisiana, the state taking the most thoughtful approach to solving its fiscal crisis. Pelican State policymakers, led by Governor Bobby Jindal, have embarked on a wide-ranging set of government reforms designed to reduce the size and cost of government.

They created a Commission on Streamlining Government this year to identify over $1.5 billion in cost savings through streamlining, consolidation, and elimination. They passed legislation granting more flexibility in cutting spending in protected "silos." Gov. Jindal has eliminated thousands of positions from the state budget and over 70 unnecessary or inactive state boards and commissions. The Louisiana Division of Administration is developing a range of privatization proposals within each of its departments, and it's also piloting a new budgeting approach designed to fund priorities and drive performance. And this is all just a start.

It's already paying off. Ratings agency Fitch upgraded Louisiana's bond rating last month, specifically citing the state's focus on spending control and streamlining as influencing factors. This alone will save taxpayers millions in avoided interest costs over time.

Arizona policymakers face a simple choice: remain lost in the fiscal forest with California or follow the lead of Louisiana, which is blazing a trail out.

Similar thoughts here and here.

» Reason Foundation's Privatization Research and Commentary

Private Prisons a Smart Strategy for Arizona

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 12:22:00 EST

Letter to the Editor at the Arizona Daily Star

Susan Maurer's fears of prison privatization ("Privatizing prisons: A shortsighted fix, a long-term nightmare," Nov. 10, 2009) are based on myths, not facts.

Private prisons are helping federal, state and local governments deliver quality correctional services and programming amid tightening budgets. A 2008 Vanderbilt University study showed significant cost savings through prison privatization, and a recent Harvard Law Review article found that private prisons outperform public prisons on most quality indicators.

Moreover, private prisons are subject to strong government oversight and are held accountable to the standards set by the public sector and independent accreditation agencies. Private prisons also have strong track records on safety, security and the development of innovative inmate education and treatment programs.

Taxpayers should not be misled. With prison capacity needs growing and budgets shrinking, a greater reliance on private prisons is a sensible strategy for Arizona.

Leonard C. Gilroy
Director of Government Reform, Reason Foundation

Louisiana Provides Model for Closing Budget Deficit

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 10:22:00 EST

Goldwater Institute

Arizona policymakers need to accept the reality that there's no way to avoid government downsizing. The state is now second to only California in the severity of its fiscal crisis and faces over $5 billion in additional budget deficits through 2011. Yet, our officials remain distracted by Sacramento-style accounting gimmicks and a proposed sales tax hike that wouldn't come close to closing the gap. Worse, many policymakers seem more concerned with preserving agency largesse than trying to eliminate it.

Contrast this with Louisiana, the state taking the most thoughtful approach to solving its fiscal crisis. Pelican State policymakers, led by Governor Bobby Jindal, have embarked on a wide-ranging set of government reforms designed to reduce the size and cost of government.

They created a Commission on Streamlining Government this year to identify over $1.5 billion in cost savings through streamlining, consolidation, and elimination. They passed legislation granting more flexibility in cutting spending in protected "silos." Gov. Jindal has eliminated thousands of positions from the state budget and over 70 unnecessary or inactive state boards and commissions. The Louisiana Division of Administration is developing a range of privatization proposals within each of its departments, and it's also piloting a new budgeting approach designed to fund priorities and drive performance. And this is all just a start.

It's already paying off. Ratings agency Fitch upgraded Louisiana's bond rating last month, specifically citing the state's focus on spending control and streamlining as influencing factors. This alone will save taxpayers millions in avoided interest costs over time.

Arizona policymakers face a simple choice: remain lost in the fiscal forest with California or follow the lead of Louisiana, which is blazing a trail out.

Leonard Gilroy is the director of government reform at Reason Foundation (reason.org) and resides in Fountain Hills. This article was originally published by the Arizona-based Goldwater Institute.

Learn More:

Pew Center on the States: "Beyond California: States in Fiscal Peril"
Louisiana Commission on Streamlining Government

Cash-Strapped North Texas Cities Embrace Privatization

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Mon, 16 Nov 2009 13:45:00 EST

Theodore Kim at the Dallas Morning News highlights the growing trend of municipal privatization/outsouring in North Texas cities:

Plano decided to eliminate its city printing and graphic design staff in September, farming out the work to Office Depot and Ricoh.

At Plano's Douglass Community Recreation Center, Kennedy Estrada, 10, runs in the gym. The Boys and Girls Club of Collin County may take over operating the center.

Leaders in cash-strapped Rowlett may contract out city planning services, tech support and other departments. [...]

In North Texas, Dallas officials hope to save some $1.5 million this year, as well as millions more later, by transferring the reins of the city zoo to the Dallas Zoological Society.

And Dallas County, by some estimates, could save up to $1 million by contracting out for certain legal services.

"In the environment we are in, cities are going to have to look at every option," said Chris Hoene, research director for the National League of Cities in Washington, D.C.

I couldn't agree more. Former Indianapolis Mayor and Harvard Kennedy School professor Stephen Goldsmith adds an important point—the trick for policymakers will be to ensure that the cost savings with privatization are accompanied by current or higher levels of service quality:

"The question becomes: How can you save money by outsourcing and managed competition while improving the quality of service, or at least keeping it the same?" Goldsmith said.

This is why performance-based contracting and good contract management and oversight are such critical skills for public administrators to cultivate internally, as these are the direct means through which to ensure that contractors deliver on performance. In a Governing column last month, Goldsmith offers similar thoughts from a different angle—the setting of arbitrary federal insourcing mandates by the Obama administration:

So rather than committing to insourcing 7 percent of existing contracts, let's ask some fundamental questions: What are the costs (activity-based costing) per unit of work accomplished? How are outputs and outcomes measured? How are high performing workers acknowledged and rewarded? How is citizen satisfaction measured and translated into accountability? What are the private and public benchmarks by which productivity is compared? Can a part of the service be tested in the marketplace for true comparisons?

In Indianapolis, we found that theoretical examinations of our public agencies were often way off the actual results produced by competition. For example, a consultant told us that we could save maybe 5 percent by privatizing our wastewater-treatment facility. We held a competition, and wound up saving 44 percent. Even in cases where we didn't contract out, public agencies that were exposed to competition found ways to reduce their costs.

Deciding what to contract out and what to do in-house requires hard facts. Are there private contractors or nonprofits that provide similar services? How recently was the market tested? Most important, many complicated services are neither wholly insourced nor outsourced, but rather are accomplished in partnership, with government responsible for quality management and a network of contractors providing the back-office and front-office support.

For the federal government, there will be certain activities that you may decide are inherently governmental. For reasons of national security, you may want to keep certain skill sets in-house, regardless of cost inefficiencies. That's fine. But as a general rule, a competitive process is the best way to discover whether insourcing or outsourcing makes sense. In every case, the goal should be "rightsourcing."

Read the whole thing for a sage perspective from a pioneer in competitive public service delivery.

» Reason Foundation's Annual Privatization Report 2009
» Reason Foundation's Privatization Research and Commentary

Following California Down the Path to Fiscal Ruin

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Fri, 13 Nov 2009 17:43:00 EST

The NGA-NASBO reports issued yesterday—which predict a fiscal "lost decade" for states—weren't the only source of bad news for state policymakers. The Pew Center on the States also released a new report—Beyond California: States in Fiscal Peril—profiling the fiscal disasters in the worst-hit state, California, and nine others (Arizona, Rhode Island, Michigan, Oregon, Nevada, Florida, New Jersey, Illinois and Wisconsin) that aren't far behind in the severity of their crises. The report is well worth a read for some insights into what's driving these fiscal trainwrecks.

As this Arizona Republic piece by Mary Joe Pitzl notes, these states share some common problems—overreliance on specific economic sectors, voter-approved spending mandates, and general lack of political will to create economically-sustainable fiscal policy, to name a few. But at a practical level the biggest problem, of course, is the mismatch between revenues and expenditures. Arizona's is pretty simple and stark:

...Currently, Arizona's budget calls for $10 billion in spending, but there is only $6.4 billion in projected revenue.

As I wrote yesterday, an imbalance of this scale is not something policymakers can simply tax, borrow and gimmick their way out of, in good economic times or bad.

There's no appetite for the level of tax increases, fee hikes and borrowing that it would take to sustain pre-recession spending levels. And those strategies are akin to shooting oneself in the foot, as they'd prolong and compound the recovery and kick the can down the road. Further, NGA and NASBO (among others) projecting tough economic times for states for the next decade so we're going to have to settle in for a long, difficult ride. Given all of these stark realities, there's no way for policymakers to avoid cutting the size and scope of government.

Banner Year for State Budget Gimmicks

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 19:51:00 EST

In the November 2009 issue of Governing, Katherine Barrett and Richard Greene argue that this may be a banner year for state budget gimmicks:

Arizona is hardly alone in looking at "creative" ways to close its budget gap. This year may go down in the record books for the number of gimmicks used to balance state budgets—and the degree to which those gimmicks may come back to haunt the entities involved. We're not particularly aware of any new tricks out there. These are tried-and-true ways for governments to avoid confronting reality—at least for a while. They include deferring payments, accelerating revenues, changing accounting rules and, as in Arizona, borrowing from the future to pay for today.

California, as is often the case, takes the cake. In its efforts to resolve its nearly $60 billion budget imbalance over this year and last year, the state borrowed from local government property taxes and special fund accounts, added to payroll withholding, accelerated personal income tax and corporate tax estimated payments, and will be kicking the June payroll to July. That last one is particularly sneaky. Employees see virtually no difference. Their paychecks arrive a day late, maybe, and that's hardly cause for outrage. But for the state it moves those payments forward a full fiscal year.

"You can argue, ‘What's the big deal?'" says Mac Taylor, California's legislative analyst. "But our concern is that it's an expense we incurred this year, and we really should count it this year. We're getting out of sync on the reporting of what we're spending."

Read the whole thing for more examples of policymakers going to every extreme to avoid making the necessary budget cuts and reforms to address the pandemic of state fiscal crises.

NGA & NASBO: States Facing Fiscal "Lost Decade"

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 18:23:00 EST

States' fiscal crises are going to stay put for some time. That's the word from the National Governors Association and the National Association of State Budget Officers, who released two reports today forecasting continued fiscal woe for states over the next decade. From the press release (emphasis mine):

The weakening of state fiscal conditions is reflected in the $250 billion in budget gaps faced by states between fiscal 2009 and fiscal 2011. Of the $250 billion, states closed $72.7 billion in budget gaps during fiscal 2009 and $113.1 billion before the enactment of their fiscal 2010 budgets to bring them into balance with drastically declining revenues.

"These are the worst numbers we’ve ever seen in the decades of putting together this report," said NASBO Executive Director Scott D. Pattison. "States have been forced to lay off and furlough employees, raise taxes, drain rainy day funds and sharply cut state spending in ways that impact every part of state government."

Even after closing these gaps, an additional $14.5 billion in budget gaps remains in fiscal 2010, and states face at least $21.9 billion in budget gaps for fiscal 2011. To help close these gaps, 42 states cut their enacted fiscal 2009 budgets by $31.2 billion, and 33 states cut their fiscal 2010 expenditures by $53.5 billion. Additionally, states enacted tax and fee increases of $23.8 billion along with additional increases in other revenue measures of $7.7 billion for fiscal 2010.

According to an NGA analysis titled The State Fiscal Situation: The Lost Decade, the recent economic downturn, one of the deepest and longest since the Great Depression, began in December 2007. Although the recession likely ended in August or September 2009, states struggled in fiscal 2009 and will continue to struggle through most of the decade.

"States will continue to struggle over the next decade because of the combination of the length and depth of this economic downturn, the projected slow recovery and the overhang of unmet needs," said NGA Executive Director Raymond C. Scheppach. "The unmet needs are those postponed or deferred during the crisis including, replenishing retiree pension and health care trust funds and financing maintenance, technology and infrastructure investments. States will also need to rebuild contingency or rainy day funds. The bottom line is that states will not fully recover from this recession until late in the next decade."

More privatization has to be part of the solution here—it's unavoidable. Most state policymakers are extremely resistant to cutting existing spending and public jobs, but the severity of the problem makes these things necessary and inevitable. Banking on tax hikes and revenue enhancements to close the gap is a fantasy—even if there was the political and popular will to raise taxes in a tough economy (which there isn't), taxpayers would never stand for the level of tax increases it would take to close the massive budget deficits on the table for the next few years.

You can't avoid cutting the size and scope of government, regardless of what happens on the tax and fee side. Given that reality, privatization is a strong tool to deploy and will become a critical part of smart fiscal management in the near term. Done well, you can get more bang for fewer tax dollars while still ensuring the quality delivery of services. Win-win for the budget and taxpayers.

Louisiana has already figured this out. Hopefully other states will start to follow their lead.

» Reason Foundation's Annual Privatization Report 2009
» Reason Foundation's Privatization Research and Commentary

Don't Believe the Hype on Federal "Insourcing"

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 17:30:00 EST

Get ready for some spin from the White House on the supposed cost savings of insourcing (or de-privatizing) federal work, writes Professional Services Council president Sam Soloway in an excellent column at Washington Technology. As Soloway notes, these claims will have been based on fuzzy math that utterly underestimates the government's true costs of doing business:

When President Barack Obama's budget goes to Congress next February, the Defense Department and other agencies will announce budget savings that have been achieved from insourcing. Unfortunately, most of those savings also will be largely illusory.

The military departments already have told their field activities that for every insourced position, a 30 to 40 percent savings is being included in the fiscal 2011 budget. Furthermore, each activity has been given an insourcing target to achieve. As a result, we are seeing more arbitrary insourcing of purely commercial activities, rather than a focus on the critical skills the government most needs.

However, the process of accounting for those savings simply does not capture the total costs of a federal employee, including salary, benefit, and all the attendant support systems required for each employee. Thus, the savings are based on fuzzy math at best. If an Air Force organization insources a support services contract, it might look like such action generates savings for the organization’s budget. But this tells little about the total costs that are paid out of other budgets to cover expenses such as construction and infrastructure, pay and personnel systems and offices, travel systems, training and development, and cell phones and laptops. Those expenses are essentially invisible and perceived as free to the unit commander.

Some argue that government agencies are factoring in those costs in their budgets. Although no one has been willing to disclose publicly the algorithms they are using — and we have asked for them — it is interesting that in a July letter to 11 members of Congress who raised questions on this topic, a senior Defense Department official said more detailed cost guidance would be issued this fall, long after the budget assumptions were made and the insourcing directives issued to the field.

Read the whole thing for a glimpse at bad public policy in the making. And this gaming of the numbers is in no way unique to the Obama administration. In fact, it's Tactics 101 from the anti-privatization playbook—use the labrynthine nature of the bureaucracy and budget to shuffle/obfuscate the all-in costs of public service delivery in an effort to justify an avoidance of competition. In short, assume away those costs (pensions, retiree health care obligations, overhead, facility maintenance, etc.) that are paid outside of an agency's direct budget. This creates an apples-to-oranges situation, as the private sector has to factor those all-in costs in its bids. I recently wrote on a similar example in Oklahoma corrections here and here.

This is why a sound privatization program must rely on evaluation systems and methodologies to get as close as possible to an apples-to-apples, public-vs-private comparison. Of course, this is based on the notion that policymakers actually have an obligation to taxpayers to get the best value possible for taxpayers' money.

Unfortunately, the federal government does not yet have a sound privatization program—nor does it seem to elevate value for taxpayer money to a central pursuit (or even a minor pursuit, for that matter). Hence politics, not sound policy, drive decisions that lead to arbitrary insourcing mandates and a massive expansion of the costly federal workforce. And of course, taxpayers will lose in the end, even as they're being told they've gotten a win through insourcing.

Taxpayers should read Soloway's column and ask themselves: is this the way you want your government to make decisions?

» Reason Foundation's Annual Privatization Report 2009
» Reason Foundation's Privatization Research and Commentary

UPS vs. FedExâ��Ultimate Whiteboard Remix

Thu, 12 Nov 2009 11:35:00 EST

You may have heard that UPS is in quite the fight with FedEx. Though both are package-delivery companies, they're governed by totally different federal labor rules. As a result, UPS's workforce is much more heavily unionized than FedEx's—and more than twice as expensive.

So now UPS is trying to get FedEx reclassified under federal law as a way of screwing a competitor. That's horrendous, but it also makes a sick kind of business sense. And it also reveals the real villain: A government that is big enough to absolutely, positively guarantee it can screw any business. Overnight.

"UPS Vs. FEDEX" was produced by Meredith Bragg and Nick Gillespie (who also hosts). Approximately two minutes long.

This video is based on "Using Unions as Weapons," by Veronique de Rugy, which appeared in the October 2009 print edition of Reason.

Go here for downloadable versions. This video is also available at Reason.tv's YouTube channel. Subscribe now.

Milwaukee County Board Chooses Tax Hikes Over Privatization

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 14:48:00 EST

As I've written recently, the Milwaukee County Board is where good privatization ideas go to die—in particular those proposed by County Executive Scott Walker, who deserves credit for his tenacity in trying. It's happened yet again, as the Board has just opted for higher taxes to avoid privatization of public functions. Per the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel:

The Milwaukee County Board adopted a precariously balanced 2010 budget early Tuesday that sets aside nearly all of County Executive Scott Walker's privatization efforts, ditches a proposed "wheel tax" and raises the property tax levy 3.8%, or nearly $10 million, to $267 million.

The budget approved by the board included a set of employee concessions with a much lower price tag than those Walker had wanted. Like Walker's, the ones the board approved have not yet been bargained with unions. [...]

After nearly four hours of closed-door negotiations Monday night, supervisors reversed an earlier decision and agreed to accept the privatization of 15 county mainframe computer technicians, to tap into an unemployment compensation reserve fund and to reject a bus rapid transit plan that Walker wanted. [...]

The board voted to reject the outsourcing of housekeeping and security jobs at the courthouse complex and other county buildings. Supervisors also turned back Walker’s proposed outsourcing of 25 airport firefighter jobs.

Together, those moves would add about $5 million to Walker's budget, which counted on privatization to help freeze the property tax levy for 2010 at this year's $257 million.

There were some minor, potential bright spots, however. First, the Board agreed to study health savings accounts and a potential shift from a defined-benefit to a 401(k)-style defined-contribution pension system for new employees. If these policies were implemented, the County would at least stop digging the entitlement hole deeper. Second, the Board agreed to study Walker's proposal to privatize the operations and management of the County zoo.

On the zoo privatization front, hopefully County Board members will see this excellent piece by Detroit Free-Press columnist Tom Walsh on how the private sector rescued the Detroit Zoo under an arrangement similar to that which Walker is proposing (and which Dallas has just begun to implement):

For a telling Detroit example of how a public-private partnership can save and improve a regional asset that government can no longer afford, look no further than where the wild things are. [...]

The Detroit Zoo's record of growing attendance while controlling costs and boosting visitor satisfaction -- all during a horrible economic time -- is remarkable.

This didn't happen easily. When the city struck a deal in 2006 to turn operation of the zoo over to the Detroit Zoological Society, it came after the usual squeals of protest from some in Detroit who didn't want to surrender control of a so-called city-owned jewel. [...]

The city still owns the assets, but the nonprofit Zoological Society runs operations, and much of the budget comes from the regional tax.[...]

On the cost side, the biggest savings was switching employee retirement plans from defined-benefit pensions to contributory 401(k) plans, as many private companies have done. Kagan said benefit costs are now about 29% of salaries, down from 70% when the workers were City of Detroit employees.

» Reason Foundation's Annual Privatization Report 2009
» Reason Foundation's Privatization Research and Commentary

Dave Bing's Last-Second Shot

shikha.dalmia@reason.org (Shikha Dalmia) — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 16:16:00 EST

The Wall Street Journal

On Tuesday, voters in Detroit trudged to the polls and re-elected 65-year-old Mayor Dave Bing, giving him five new city council members to accomplish a mission impossible: bring Michigan's biggest city back from near death. There's no clear prescription that will work, and Detroit's recalcitrant public-employee unions will resist the fiscal therapy that will necessarily be a part of any recovery.

Last year, Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick headed off to prison for using city funds to cover up an affair with a staffer. After a few months of an interim mayor, Mr. Bing stepped in to finish Kilpatrick's remaining time in office neither out of political ambition (he's announced he won't seek two terms) nor to get rich (he is donating his salary to the police department). The former Detroit Piston basketball legend who later made a fortune as an auto supplier genuinely wants to use his business acumen to save the city. But Detroit is much closer to the brink than many people acknowledge.

Detroit has been in trouble for decades. It has the highest taxes in Michigan, the highest murder rate in the country, and a dreadful public school system. Only 25% of high school students graduate each year. Its tens of thousands of abandoned homes offer safe haven to drug dealers and criminals. All of this has produced an exodus of businesses—there is no longer a single major department store in the city—and residents. Detroit's population is less than half of its peak of two million in the 1960s.

With the collapse of the auto industry over the past year and a half, things have gotten a lot worse. Unemployment is now touching Depression levels of around 30%—three times the national rate. Businesses that depend on the auto industry are shutting down and more residents are hitting the exits. This is accelerating the erosion of the city's tax base, producing a fiscal crisis that seems impossible to escape. The city's accumulated deficit is currently somewhere between $300 million and $400 million. No one knows for sure because the city has yet to submit its 2008 audit; its annual budget is about $3 billion.

Joe Harris, a former chief financial officer of Detroit, notes that when Mr. Bing took office this summer, the city had enough cash on hand to make payroll, pay vendors and meet other day-to-day needs for about 11 days. To make ends meet, Mr. Bing is planning to issue "tax anticipation" notes to lenders to raise $94 million against expected tax revenues. This money, along with the biannual property taxes that the city collected in August, might keep Detroit running through the end of the fiscal year next June.

But that won't address the underlying fiscal imbalances. For that problem, Mr. Bing wants to squeeze $5 million in savings every month by asking the city's roughly 13,000 workers to take a 10% pay cut, a 10% benefit cut, and a 10% staff cut. He also wants to privatize or outsource many city services and consolidate various departments. "Our people [city workers] need to understand that entitlement is gone," Mr. Bing told the Detroit News in August. "There are people who think we are job providers. We're service providers."

Mr. Bing is going to have a very hard time making the city's entrenched unions play ball. John Reihl, president of the American Federation of State, Council and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Local 207, regards Mr. Bing's talk of cuts as a personal insult. "It is just a way to mess with the unions," he told the Detroit News in July. "It's not our role to give anymore concessions."

So far Mr. Bing has shown little indication that he'll stand up to the unions. For the third time on Friday, Mr. Bing backed off on his threat to lay off more workers if unions don't accept a wage cut. Yet a recent study by the Mackinac Center for Public Policy found that if state and local government employee benefit packages in Michigan were limited to what is typical for Midwestern private sector workers—including those in unions—taxpayers would save as much as $5.7 billion annually.

The fiscal mess puts Mr. Bing in a Catch-22. He can't cut the city's taxes because the short-term hit to cash flow would leave the city unable to pay its bills. But without tax reform the city can't lure businesses back.

Detroit may simply not be viable in its current form. Political and economic leaders need to rethink the notion that the city can regain its former status as a major American metropolis capable of luring large companies with tax breaks—which was Mr. Kilpatrick's failed strategy.

Detroit now more closely resembles a frontier town that needs not flashy stadiums and art institutes but basic services: police, firemen and good schools. Mr. Bing needs to confront the hard reality that the city needs to pare back its liabilities, identify infrastructure it can no longer afford to maintain, and (though this is anathema to Detroit's political class) perhaps auction off portions of its 140 square miles to neighboring counties, shrinking to a size that its diminished population base can support.

Short term, Detroit's best hope may be to go bankrupt. However, given Michigan law, which has never been tested because no city has ever filed for bankruptcy, it's unclear if even bankruptcy will fully release Detroit from the clutches of its unions and allow it to start over. The only thing certain is that fate is not kind to a city that allows unions to run amok.

Shikha Dalmia is a Senior Analyst at Reason Foundation. This column first appeared in The Wall Street Journal.

The Secret Message of Stimulus Spending

vdereugy@gmu.edu (Veronique de Rugy) — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 12:42:00 EST

The idea behind the $787 billion stimulus bill is that government can create jobs by spending money. For now, let’s ignore fact, history, and economic theory and assume that government spending can actually create jobs.

In that case, we should expect the government to invest relatively more money in the states that have the highest unemployment rates and less money in the states with lower unemployment rates. So let’s check the data.

Using numbers from President Obama’s website Recovery.org and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, this chart plots the amount of stimulus funds spent per person in each state and the corresponding unemployment rate in that state. The solid blue line shows what the allocation of funds should look like if the administration was allocating relatively more money to the states with higher unemployment rates.

Yet, with a few exceptions, the data show that this is not the case. Many higher-unemployment states are getting far fewer stimulus dollars than lower-unemployment states.

Take Michigan, for instance. Michigan’s 15.2 percent unemployment rate is the highest in the country. So far, it has received $403 per person in stimulus funds. That’s above the average stimulus per person across all states ($326). However, it’s lower than the $409 per person that the state of Vermont, a state with relatively low unemployment (6.8 percent), has received so far. Michigan's per-person take is also much lower than the $707 per person the District of Columbia received. D.C.'s unemployment rate is 9.9 percent.

Now look at the state with the lowest unemployment rate in the country: North Dakota. It’s getting $253 per person with a 4.3 percent unemployment rate. Many other states are receiving roughly the same amount of stimulus funds per person despite much higher rates of unemployment.

Which suggests that stimulus funds are being allocated without thought to the level of unemployment within states. If government spending could in fact create jobs, then the problem of unemployment could be mitigated by distributing funds to states based on their relative unemployment levels.

But that's not being done at all. Instead, funds are being distributed randomly, as quickly as possible, among the states. That in turn suggests something else: Even the federal government doesn't believe the myth that government spending can actually create jobs.

Veronique de Rugy is an economist at The Mercatus Center at George Mason University and a columnist for Reason. This column first appeared at Reason.com.

A Hard Pill to Swallow

jsullum@reason.com (Jacob Sullum) — Thu, 29 Oct 2009 12:05:00 EDT

In August, Christina Romer, chairwoman of the White House Counsel of Economic Advisers, suggested that we think of the $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act as an extremely expensive course of antibiotics. “Suppose you go to your doctor for a strep throat,” Romer said in a speech to the Economic Club of Washington, “and he or she prescribes an antibiotic.” If your fever goes up after you take the first pill, just as unemployment rose after the stimulus bill was enacted, that doesn’t mean “the medicine is useless,” Romer noted. It could simply be that “the illness was more serious than you and the doctor thought.”

But it’s also possible that your sore throat and fever are caused by a virus, not a bacterium, in which case the antibiotic will not help. Eventually, though, you will recover on your own, and you may mistakenly conclude that your doctor’s prescription did the trick.

Such erroneous causal inferences are always a hazard when it comes to government spending aimed at alleviating a recession. Even if most or all of the money is disbursed after the recession has ended (which is typically the case), stimulus advocates can say the recovery would have been weaker without the spending. Since there’s no readily available parallel universe in which to test that counterfactual hypothesis, it can never be conclusively disproved.

Still, Romer seemed unreasonably sure that Dr. Obama’s medicine was already kicking in. Although she conceded that “the evidence from the path of the economy over time can’t settle the issue of what the effects of the Recovery Act have been,” her answer to the question posed in the title of her speech—“Is It Working?”—was “absolutely.”

I guess that depends on how you define “working.” No doubt spending billions of dollars in borrowed money has some impact on the economy. But the idea that the stimulus package had much to do with an incipient recovery that may have begun in June is belied by a couple of inconvenient facts.

First, since World War II the length of recessions has ranged from six to 16 months, with an average of 10. The current recession officially began in December 2007, so a recovery by the second half of 2009 is what you would expect.

Second, according to ProPublica, only $73 billion of the $580 billion in stimulus spending had been disbursed at the time of Romer’s speech. Another $37 billion or so had gone out in the form of tax cuts.

Romer conceded the latter portion of the stimulus did not seem to be very stimulating. She said “consumption fell slightly in the second quarter after rising slightly in the first quarter,” which “could be a sign that households are initially using the tax cut mainly to increase their saving and pay off debt.”

Is it plausible to suggest that $73 billion in stimulus spending over five months had a decisive impact on a $14 trillion economy? I say “decisive” because President Barack Obama, back in February, presented the stimulus package as the only alternative to a never-ending recession, and in August he claimed, “We’ve rescued our economy from catastrophe.”

Even if we accept the Obama administration’s numbers, taxpayers do not seem to be getting much employment bang for their buck. Romer estimated that “employment is now about 485,000 jobs above what it otherwise would have been.” That comes out to more than $200,000 per job, which seems pretty pricey, especially since many of these jobs are temporary.

Here is where the “reinvestment” part comes into play. Administration officials say the stimulus package is all about putting Americans back to work. When asked whether this is an efficient way to do that, they claim all the work needs to be done anyway. Conversely, when asked whether all the projects are really worth the money spent on them, they cite jobs “created or saved” as a backup justification. Stimulus means never having to admit you’re wasting money.

Senior Editor Jacob Sullum (jsullum@reason.com) is a syndicated columnist. This column first appeared at Reason.com.

Self-Governance Works

info@reason.org (John Stossel) — Thu, 29 Oct 2009 11:19:00 EDT

Much of what government does is based on the premise that people can't do things for themselves. So government must do it for them. More often than not, the result is a ham-handed, bumbling, one-size-fits-all approach that leaves the intended beneficiaries worse off. Of course, this resulting failure is never blamed on the political approach—on the contrary, failure is taken to mean the government solution was not extravagant enough.

We who have confidence in what free people can achieve have long believed that government should not venture beyond its narrow sphere of providing physical security. It should not attempt to cure every social ill. So it's good to learn that serious scholars have demonstrated that our intuitions are right. Free people, given the chance, solve what many "experts" think are problems that require state intervention.

For that reason, Elinor Ostrom's winning of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences ought to kindle a new interest in freedom. (See my earlier column here.)

Ostrom made her mark through field studies that show people solving one of the more vexing problems: efficient management of a common-pool resource (CPR), such as a pasture or fishery. With an unowned "commons," each individual has an incentive to get the most out of it without putting anything back.

If I take fish from a common fishing area, I benefit completely from those fish. But if I make an investment to increase the future number of fish, others benefit, too. So why should I risk making the investment? I'll wait for others to do it. But everyone else faces the same free-rider incentive. So we end up with a depleted resource and what Garrett Harden called "the tragedy of the commons."

Except, says Ostrom, we often don't. There is also an "opportunity of the commons." While most politicians conclude that, depending on the resource, efficient management requires either privatization or government ownership, Ostrom finds examples of a third way: "self-organizing forms of collective action," as she put it in an interview a few years ago. Her message is to be wary of government promises.

"Field studies in all parts of the world have found that local groups of resource users, sometimes by themselves and sometimes with the assistance of external actors, have created a wide diversity of institutional arrangements for cooperating with common-pool resources."

She has studied, for example, self-governing irrigation systems in Nepal and found successes never anticipated in the textbooks. "Irrigation systems built and governed by the farmers themselves are on average in better repair, deliver more water, and have higher agricultural productivity than those provided and managed by a government agency. ... (F)armers craft their own rules, which frequently offset the perverse incentives they face in their particular physical and cultural settings. These rules may be almost invisible to outsiders. ..."

In Governing the Commons, she writes about self-governed commons in Switzerland, Japan, the Philippines, and elsewhere that date back hundreds of years. For example, in the alpine village of Tobel, Switzerland, herdsmen "tend village cattle on communally owned alpine meadows" under rules of an association created in 1483. The rules govern who has access to the grazing lands and how many cows a herdsman can place there, preventing overgrazing. The cattle owners themselves run the association and handle the monitoring. Sanctions are imposed for violation of the rules, but compliance is high.

Don't mistake the association for government. Rather, it is a private co-op designed for a narrow purpose. "All of the Swiss institutions used to govern commonly owned alpine meadows have one obvious similarity—the appropriators themselves make all the major decisions about the use of the CPR."

She found something similar in Japanese villages, where residents use private property for some agricultural purposes and self-managed common forests for others.

Solutions imposed by external authority were not necessary—and usually self-defeating: "Academics, aid donors, international nongovernmental organizations, central governments, and local citizens need to learn and relearn that no government can develop the full array of knowledge, institutions and social capital needed to govern development efficiently and sustainably. ..."

How about that? Freedom works.

John Stossel will soon host Stossel on the Fox Business Network. He's the author of Give Me a Break and of Myth, Lies, and Downright Stupidity. This column first appeared at Reason.com.

Anti-Privatization Pacheco Law Continues to Hamstring Massachusetts Budget

adam.summers@reason.org (Adam Summers) — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 23:35:00 EDT

My colleague, Len Gilroy, did an excellent post the other day on efforts to repeal or amend the anti-privatization Pacheco Law in Massachusetts. Reason has been critical of the Pacheco Law for many years. Back in 2002, Reason VP for Research Adrian Moore, former Reasoner Geoffrey Segal, and I wrote a white paper for the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research on privatization and the effects of the Pacheco Law in Massachusetts. Here is an excerpt from that paper:

When faced with insufficient revenues, state governments typically have four options: increase taxes, scale back expenditures, spend down reserves, or seek ways to provide services more efficiently through contracting with private providers. Massachusetts, however, has only the first three options available; it is the only state in the nation that has virtually outlawed the privatization of public services.

The Pacheco Law was enacted by the Massachusetts legislature in 1993. The law, now M.G.L. ch. 7 sections 52-55, set up a series of tests that a state agency must pass before it can award a contract to a private company to perform services that had been previously performed by state employees. The law presents both statutory and political roadblocks to efficient government operations. Its provisions essentially slam the door on many opportunities that have been shown to improve services and save money in other places, as the law disregards all potential benefits other than lower costs.

Reducing costs is only one of many reasons agencies in other states choose to contract with private service providers. Well-designed contracts allow agencies to improve quality, accommodate peak demand, speed project delivery and meet deadlines, gain access to expertise, improve efficiency, spur innovation, and manage risk more effectively.

The Pacheco Law essentially prohibits Massachusetts agencies from contracting out to improve service quality, increase the number of people served, or reduce an existing backlog. A proposal to contract out cleaning and maintenance of bus shelters—which would have brought several million dollars annually to the state from new advertising revenues—was rejected because the contractor did not specifically calculate the difference in cleaning costs.

When a Massachusetts agency entertains bids for the right to deliver a service, public employees have the opportunity to submit bids to keep the work in-house. The Pacheco Law gives state workers significant advantages.

The cost and quality of service offered by private contractors must be compared not to existing cost and quality but to the hypothetical situation of public employees working in the most cost-effective manner and providing the highest quality possible. At no time are state employees held to these standards. If public employees win the contract, they are not held any concessions made as part of the bid.
The contractor must add lost tax revenues to the cost of the bid if any work is to be performed outside Massachusetts. No such adjustment is made to the public sector bid for the loss of tax revenues that would be realized if the work were to be performed by a private business subject to state taxes.
Private bids must also include estimated costs of monitoring contractor performance, while no such monitoring takes place in the public sector. The likely benefits of monitoring are not considered.

Even if a private contract scales these hurdles, the State Auditor may reject any proposal he deems not to be “in the public interest,” without providing a definition or reason. The rulings are final and may not be appealed.

Prior to the passage of the Pacheco Law, the Weld administration issued 36 privatization contracts, saving taxpayers an estimated $273 million. The procedure Massachusetts agencies must follow under the Pacheco Law is so onerous that only eight proposals have been submitted to the Auditor since its adoption in 1993. Only six were approved.

Over the last decade, federal, state, and local government agencies nationwide have contracted with private vendors to provide services from data processing to prison operations to adoption. According to the Government Contracting Institute, the value of federal, state, and local government contracts to private firms is up 65 percent since 1996 and exceeded $400 billion in 2001. Massachusetts law should not continue to prohibit agencies from taking advantage of this tool for reducing the cost and increasing the quality of state services.

Ideally, the Pacheco Law should be repealed. Short of repeal, it should be amended such that privatization can become a useful policy tool for legislators and agency managers.

Sadly, the Pacheco Law remains on the books seven years later. The silver lining of the state's current fiscal straits is that at least now there seems to be some momentum to weaken or eliminate the law and use the efficiency of the private sector to help balance the budget while providing high-quality services.

Other Resources:

» Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research White Paper: Competition & Government Services: Can Massachusetts Still Afford the Pacheco Law?

» Reason Foundation's Annual Privatization Report 2009 (See page 19 for discussion of the Pacheco Law)

» Reason Foundation's Privatization Research and Commentary

'The Last Gasp of the Dinosaurs'

matt.welch@reason.com (Matt Welch) — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 11:11:00 EDT

In the April 1996 edition of reason, then-Editor Virginia Postrel wrote a column arguing that “Steve Forbes is a serious candidate” for president. “Not because he’s a rousing speaker,” Postrel observed, “but because he believes in the open-ended future, in the creativity of free people, and in the importance of clear, simple, limited rules within which individuals can shape their own decisions.”

Of those “clear, simple, limited rules,” the most famous was a flat and reduced personal and corporate income tax, an idea that, while never coming close to adoption at the federal level, nonetheless propelled a long-shot magazine publisher with no political experience into a third-place finish in the Republican primaries, including wins in Arizona and Delaware. In 2000 a flat tax song and social conservative dance helped Forbes whisk into second-place at the Iowa caucus, but he quickly dropped out after finishing third in New Hampshire and Delaware. In 2008 Forbes was a strong backer of the doomed Rudolph Giuliani.

Malcolm Stevenson Forbes Jr., 62, is the third Forbes to publish the successful business title of the same name. Founded in 1917, Forbes has gleefully billed itself as the “Capitalist Tool,” lionizing the entrepreneurs who make the world a richer place. In addition to producing its signature lists of the country’s (and globe’s) richest capitalists and companies, the 900,000-circulation magazine has been a staunch opponent of antitrust enforcement, an aggressive supporter of anti-totalitarian movements abroad, and a stubborn purveyor of a sunny, market-based optimism. Last November, at the height of political panic over the financial crisis, Forbes put Forbes himself on the cover, explaining “How Capitalism Will Save Us.”

In July, Editor in Chief Matt Welch interviewed Steve Forbes at the annual FreedomFest conference in Las Vegas.

reason: People know you as Steve Forbes, flat taxer and presidential candidate, but you’re also publisher of Forbes magazine in an era when magazines are struggling. How is Forbes responding to the economic crisis, the publishing crisis, and the transformation of the print industry?

Steve Forbes: When you have a severe recession and you have something transformational as we now see un-folding with the Web, you have to do two things. One, you have to address the immediate circumstances, which means belt tightening, which we did—and we did after 2001, when the economy also went temporarily off of the cliff. But at the same time, you have to invest for the future. And thankfully, 12 years ago, when we went online as did everyone else, we did not make the mistake that many print publishers made, and that was to think you take the printed page, throw it online, and have your electronic publishing. When Thomas Edison invented movies, some people thought you’d film a stage play and that was a feature film. No. It’s an entirely different medium.

We’ve always focused on entrepreneurs, on investors—on capitalist people who want to get ahead, people who want to do things in business. So we saw the website as another platform to reach the same constituency. Our value added is information, insights, and analyses, plus our profound belief in the moral basis of capitalism, which is meeting the needs and wants of other people. If you have that, you don’t get hung up on what the particular platform is.

reason: David Carr had a piece about you guys in The New York Times—a little snarky, but it was interesting. One thing he posited is that in 2009 this whole “Capitalist Tool” stuff is out of fashion; it’s out of step with the times. What’s your broad response to the notion that your stance or ethos is out of step and anachronistic?

Forbes: Well, capitalism—entrepreneurial capitalism, democratic capitalism—always goes through phases where it’s, quote, “out of fashion.” And it’s usually because of catastrophic mistakes made by government. The victim is blamed for it.

But you don’t abandon your mission or your core values because a crisis has put capitalism under a cloud. We went through it in the ’30s, we went through it in the ’70s, the greedy decade of the ’80s. These things do happen. But I think what’s happening in Wash-ington is the last gasp of the dinosaurs of the 1930s. It’s Jurassic Park statism. Oh! Franklin Roosevelt again! Wow! But it’s not working. It didn’t work in the ’30s.

So here we are today, and what’s the response? More spending, more taxes, and the economy is not responding the way it should. But while we’re getting assaulted now, it’s also a chance to regroup and hit these people back, because they are going against human nature, they are going against the impulses that come out of true entrepreneurial capitalism. While they seem to have the commanding heights at the moment, it’s only temporary.

reason: Do you see, to borrow a phrase, some green shoots, not necessarily in the economy, but in the citizen response to Washington economics right now?

Forbes: You see it with the tea parties, and you saw it in the state of Illinois, where the governor proposed tax increases, but the Democratic legislature ended up defeating them. The most amazing thing is now unfolding in California, where they’re seriously considering a flat tax because they’re beginning to realize—the Democrats!—that a highly progressive system doesn’t produce the revenue they need for their progressive programs.

reason: Have you seen an uptick in interest in the flat tax idea? Have people been knocking on your door and saying, “Oh yeah, about that thing.…”

Forbes: It’s not so much knocking on the door as people asking, when you face a severe crisis, what do you do? That’s one contrast between the political world and the commercial world. In the commercial world, failure happens all the time. It’s part and parcel of the system. You try something; it works or doesn’t work. In politics, you often have to go to the cliff before something is done. California’s at the edge of a cliff. They can’t print money. IOUs are not quite the same as legal tender. And so that’s why they’re considering something like the flat tax. Both [Gov. Arnold] Schwarzenegger and now Democrats in the legislature are starting to brood about the idea in sort of sheer desperation. It’s a version of what Ronald Reagan said: You don’t change minds on Capitol Hill through sweet reason; you do it through the heat of public opinion.

reason: Do you see a reawakening of those values, a reawakening in the Republican Party specifically, after eight years of a presidency when government was expanded hysterically, regulation was expanded hysterically? Do you see Republicans rediscovering their limited-government roots?

Forbes: I think it’s beginning to happen. Certainly among the newer, younger members. Or ones such as Paul Ryan from Wisconsin, who gets it on monetary policy, gets it on what’s happening with entitlements. Because, clearly, trying to be a Democrat Lite is not the way to perpetual power. Power does corrupt, and the GOP began to believe that pork will buy you happiness. It didn’t. And in fact, it demoralized the base of the party.

So now we have pork squared with the Obama administration, and it’s an opportunity for the Republicans to quickly regroup and find their voice again. The Obama administration is making a classic mistake of leadership: They feel they have to do it now, but they’re trying to do too much too quickly. It’s going to blow back on them.

reason: Looking at the 2012 Republican presidential hopefuls, especially after Mark Sanford started flying to Argentina a bit too much, do you see any individuals out there who look promising? Are you still considering yourself a candidate? Will you run again?

Forbes: I’m an agitator now, so I’ll leave the running to others. I’ll watch them exercise. But I think in 2010 we’ll get a very clear picture of the field. Right now there’s just too much going on. Too much ferment. If you look at a poll, probably Mitt Romney would be at the top, just because of name recognition. But whoever would have thought three years ago that Barack Obama would beat the Clintons at their own game and win the presidency? So it’s idle speculation.

But there are some names out there—[Louisiana Gov. Bobby] Jindal, Romney, who knows what [Mike] Huckabee might do, maybe [Minnesota Gov. Tim] Pawlenty will get a little more conservative and make a move for it. So who knows, maybe Paul Ryan might emerge, maybe somebody else from the House might emerge.

The key thing is don’t depend on one person. Have many Reagans out there, doing it on the state level, on the local level, and we’ll be OK.

reason: Talking of the “Democrat Lite” characters out there, [New York Mayor Michael] Bloomberg is a favorite of mine. He just announced an eight-point proposal to create or save media jobs on the island of Manhattan. You see a lot of proposals to have the government become involved with bailing out or somehow giving new assistance to legacy print media companies on the theory that they are fundamental to our democracy. What do you think about these initiatives and the ideas behind them?

Forbes: To really survive, newspapers, each one in each city, have to figure out what is their true value added. And it’s not going to be one blueprint for all. They’re each going to have to do it differently. You mentioned David Carr, who wrote a piece a couple months ago about this crazy paper in Boston that is doing very well focusing totally on local events in an iconoclastic way. People read it, whereas traditional newspapers are withering. So you’re going to see not one-size-fits-all but each one trying to pick out the particularities that can enable it to survive.

But nostalgia is a very strong human emotion. And so, you know, canals are preserved, and they’re wonderful tourist things now, even though they’re not real arteries for commerce the way that the railroads became and then highways became or air travel became. So it’s a natural reaction, but at the end of the day, it ain’t gonna get very far, because the world’s not going to stand still. Museums are very nice, but they’re not the way to a vibrant economy.

reason: Someone made the argument that the moment any industry becomes politically engaged, and starts lobbying a lot and starts getting targeted legislation, is not the moment that it becomes powerful but the signal that it’s stopped being powerful.

Forbes: Well it’s a peculiarity of the United States that it’s a sign that you’ve become successful that the government and the politicos go after you. And it does far more harm than any possible good.

You see it time and time again—G.M. in the ’50s and ’60s deliberately kept their market share below 50 percent for fear they’d get an antitrust suit and have to spin off Chevrolet. IBM got an antitrust suit in ’68 and 20 years later was on the verge of bankruptcy. Microsoft is not the feared Darth Vader that it was 10 years ago when the government went after them. One of the things that this administration doesn’t get is that the best antitrust policy is a vibrant marketplace. When profit gives you a message that something is lucrative, others will enter into it. They’re not just going to let you—“Oh, Matt’s doing very well, making a billion dollars on this thing. Good old Matt.” They’re going to say, “How do I get that?” And they’ll plunge in.

reason: What’s your assessment of Obama’s health care package?

Forbes: Well, let’s take the president’s word that health care should be universal and affordable. How is it best achieved? We know government achieves it by rationing. And the markets achieve it by creating more of it, and finding cheaper and better ways to deliver it. What people don’t fully grasp is we don’t have free enterprise in health care today in the United States. It is a hybrid system, because it’s third party. So you have a disconnect between providers and consumers. And what kind of market is it where the consumer doesn’t know what the thing costs? Anything else, you do. What is my hamburger going to cost? What is my car going to cost? But if you go to a hospital and ask what a procedure’s going to cost, they assume either you’re a lunatic or you must not have insurance. Why else would you want to know what the price is? How weird. How unusual. Why? Somebody else is paying.

So the system doesn’t work. And you don’t get the kind of productivity you get everywhere else. We use phones and emails for everything now. Do you do consultation with your physician or nurse by phone or email? Rarely. Or hospitals giving warranties, like you have everywhere else, where if they don’t scope your knee right, you go back and don’t have to pay for it again. Why wouldn’t that be their dime? Because it’s not real competition. They know you’re not writing the checks, so therefore they don’t have to please you; they just have to make sure they get a bureaucratic insurance company to approve it.

But we see from Lasik what happens when you get a real market. It costs a third less than it did 10 years ago. Cosmetic surgery hasn’t had inflation, like you have in the rest of health care, even though demand has increased sixfold in the last 15 years and even though there have been enormous technological innovations. Why? Because you pay for it.

reason: So what do you do? This is such a labyrinthine complexity that creates the sort of mixed market which you describe. Are there simple things that can be done to break the logjam?

Forbes: Yes. Equalize tax treatment. You’re going to give employers a tax deduction, why not individuals? And how about allowing you to shop across state lines for health insurance? Illegal now. If you live in California, want to buy a policy in Seattle, illegal. Interstate Commerce Clause, hello! You don’t need a government insurance company. Just get cross-state competition.

Allowing businesses to pull together. Why not remove barriers to that?

In terms of health savings accounts, if you want a higher deductible than X, you can’t get it. I forget what the number is now for a family plan; you can only go up so high. Remove those limits or substantially raise the caps on those.

If you want to set up a clinic or hospital, in a lot of states you have to get a certificate of need. Well, do you need a certificate of need to open up a grocery store if you want to go against Wal-Mart or Whole Foods? No. You just go and do it. See what happens. But because it’s all third-party paying, well, this is inefficient; it’s sort of a cartel system. Get rid of those kinds of things.

reason: Are you surprised by President Obama since he’s come into office? Anything about his comportment, his policy, the reaction to it?

Forbes: I was hoping he would defy my expectations and turn out to be what a lot of people thought—he’s smart, he’s moderate, he’ll do the right thing—instead of being what he has been so far, which is very much an ideologue. On the left, it’s all 1930s. You spend, you tax, you have government running things because we can do it more efficiently.

reason: I find it interesting that he still gives lip service—and gets away with giving lip service—to limited-government principles, saying things like, “Of course we don’t want the government running automobile companies.” And then in the same paragraph, he’ll say “but they need to consolidate their brands” and get very hyper-specific. He still says, “We don’t want to be in the banking sector; I’d rather be doing X, Y, and Z.” It’s as if he senses these things are unpopular out there.

Forbes: That’s why they have to do this by stealth, or semi-stealth. They know the American people are not in a mood for France North America or Germany North America. So they want to use the crisis to ram this stuff through before anybody realizes. Then you’re dependent and therefore, “Oh, they want to take this away from you”; it’s a fait accompli, it’s a coup. But thankfully the Founders devised a system where this stuff just bloody takes time. They didn’t confuse efficiency in the commercial sector with efficiency in government. We don’t want an efficient government in terms of making laws.

They feared passion. They saw what the wars of religion did to Europe and the bloodshed that engendered. They wanted a system where things could cool off before you did something.

reason: You have a new book out about historical figures and lessons that can be learned from them. What are some historical figures or moments of note that can apply to present-day circumstances?

Forbes: Take Alexander the Great. When Aristotle taught him as a young man, one of the things Aristotle tried to hammer home was you must learn to conquer yourself, i.e., control your passions. Alexander did not. He seemed to think that he was actually a living god, and he destroyed himself. He was immensely talented, but it all collapsed when he died. And that’s what I think may be happening with President Obama today. Putting aside what you think of his policies, he may end up getting very little.

For example, he didn’t realize with the stimulus package that Nancy Pelosi may have run up the limit on one of his credit cards. That $800 billion would have been very helpful from their point of view on trying to finance health care. But no, they spent that. It was overreach. No sense of what the real world is like.

reason: There’s been a lot of talk about the scattered state of the modern GOP, and a lot of discussion specifically about the big tent of Ronald Reagan with evangelical Christians and limited-government people. Is that a marriage that has run its course?

Forbes: No. There are two kinds of big tents. One is when you have mush, and so people come in because there’s nothing there. Another one is recognizing that one of the peculiarities of American politics is, because we are a heterogeneous nation, you have to put together coalitions of people who may not like each other much, and they have their own particular agendas and priorities, but you have to keep this thing together and maybe you can get some things done.

And so you’re always going to have tensions; it’s never going to be smooth. One tendency for parties is to just soften everything to oblivion. Another is where you have priorities, as Reagan did, and use a coalition where there are some basic shared values, but there are always going to be fights and tensions. That’s normal.

What helps keep the country together is that you’re not going to succeed by just being a narrow-based candidate, either geographically or ideologically. You’re always going to have to persuade. Like with a family. Families never agree on anything. Well, we’re like a family. And we have those kinds of disagreements. So be it.

Fed Up

bdoherty@reason.com (Brian Doherty) — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 15:17:00 EDT

Rep. Ron Paul (R-Texas), the libertarian-leaning congressman and failed 2008 GOP presidential candidate, has been suspicious of the Federal Reserve since before first entering Congress in 1976. In a 1981 article that mentioned the then-obscure legislator, United Press International reported that Paul “has proposed abolishing the Federal Reserve, repealing laws which make the dollar legal tender, and switching to currency issued by banks, 100 percent backed by gold.”

That was the year Paul first proposed a bill to audit America’s central bank. He recruited 44 cosponsors, but the bill never made it out of committee. The congressman introduced another bill to audit the Fed in 1983 and got less than half as many colleagues to sign on.

On another six occasions, Paul introduced bills that would have abolished the Fed entirely. Those acts of legislative defiance accomplished nothing much besides giving the congressman a reputation as an eccentric gold obsessive, hectoring an institution that was seen by almost everyone, critics and supporters alike, as foundational to the functioning of the modern world. Roll Call, a newspaper covering Capitol Hill, chided Paul after he won reelection to Congress in 1996 for his “idee fixe” of “a return to the gold standard,” which it described as a “rallying cry that hasn’t been a real issue since 1971.”

What a difference an economic crisis makes. In 2007 and 2008, as Paul ran for president, the candidate found to his own surprise that his young-skewing crowds reacted to trash talk about the Federal Reserve more than any other element of his small-government, anti-war agenda. So in 2009, with many economists blaming the Federal Reserve at least partly for inflating a housing bubble whose crash continues to inflict the most economic damage seen in the U.S. for a quarter century, Paul started pushing another version of his “audit the Fed” bill, this one numbered H.R. 1207. And as of press time, the bill has attracted a remarkable 282 co-sponsors, more than a majority, giving it a nontrivial shot at passing through the House of Representatives.

H.R. 1207 would lift existing restrictions on what auditors from the Government Accountability Office are allowed to look into when examining the Fed’s books. Specifically, the bill would allow investigators to report on the Fed’s dealings with foreign banks and nations, its “actions on monetary policy matters,” and the operations of its Federal Open Market Committee, the wing whose decisions most directly affect the U.S. money supply. The legislation is cosponsored by every single Republican in the House as well as 105 Democrats.

For the first time in Paul’s long career of tilting at Alan Greenspan’s windmills, popular sentiment against the Federal Reserve has its chairman, currently Ben Bernanke, running scared. Last summer Bernanke launched an unprecedented public relations campaign, explaining himself in venues from 60 Minutes to town-hall-style meetings broadcast on PBS. In July testimony to the House Committee on Financial Services, Bernanke warned that H.R. 1207 would damage global trust in the Fed’s political independence and “could raise fears about future inflation, leading to higher long-term interest rates and reduced economic and financial stability.”

Paul, after shepherding his idea from fringe to mainstream, is almost giddy. “Now the Federal Reserve is less popular than the IRS!” the congressman told a July gathering of Young Americans for Liberty in Washington, D.C. “This issue is never going to go away. Who would have thought a politician could talk about Austrian economics and get applause?”

The Austrian Opposition

With its power over interest rates and the supply of U.S. dollars, the Federal Reserve System is the most influential economic institution on the planet. That influence comes surrounded by an impenetrable aura of mystery. Hardly anyone, citizen or congressman, completely understands what the Fed does, how it operates, or what the effects of its actions will be.

Here is a highly simplified outline. The Fed is a set of 12 regional banks under the command of a seven-member board of governors appointed by the president and approved by the Senate. Its 12-member Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—the board of governors plus five regional bank chiefs—is responsible for adjusting the federal funds interest rate, which is the rate banks charge each other for loans. The FOMC does this through “open market operations,” buying and selling securities to affect the amount of money in the economy and thus the interest rate paid by banks to get more cash.

This process is hard enough to describe, let alone comprehend, and previous Fed chairmen have found it useful to keep their public pronouncements about the central bank’s operations maximally vague and obscure. A classic from Paul Volcker, chairman from 1979 to 1987: “We did what we did, we didn’t do what we didn’t do, and the result was what happened.” Volcker’s successor, Alan Greenspan, who enjoyed the longest stretch of low-inflation prosperity in Fed history (now widely seen as possibly laying the groundwork for the crash), helped reinforce both the central bank’s reputation for effectiveness and the expectation that its actions would remain inscrutable.

But these days the Federal Reserve faces challenges to both its power and its mystery, thanks to both hot public opinion and cold academic analysis. Politicians are demanding a peek behind the curtain, and holdovers from Paul’s 2008 presidential campaign have kick-started an “End the Fed” movement. Even within the central bank’s natural fanbase of economists and financiers, many are complaining about its appetite for regulatory power and its massive expansion of the money supply. During the last year the Fed has nearly doubled the monetary measure over which it has the most direct control, the “monetary base” (defined as circulating currency plus the reserves that commercial banks keep with Federal Reserve banks).

Signs abound that public sentiment is turning against the bank. Meltdown, an anti-Fed tract by the historian Thomas Woods, sat on the New York Times bestseller list for more than a month. Woods, like Paul, embraces the “Austrian” school of economic thought, which sees central banking as a recipe for endless inflation and constantly growing government. Paul has invited him to Capitol Hill to brief a growing unofficial caucus of Republicans attracted to Paul’s hardcore anti-statism. Fed bashing has been a prominent component of Tea Party gatherings nationwide. The largely Paulite movement Campaign for Liberty has organized “contact your congressman” campaigns to get H.R. 1207 on representatives’ radar screens, and the results are pouring in.

“The bill has received as many cosponsors as it has in part because Dr. Paul’s presidential campaign really brought the Fed into the spotlight, opened people’s eyes,” Paul Martin-Foss, a legislative aide for Paul, writes in an email. “There was also a lot of grassroots support, with numerous offices telling me that they had received a lot of mail about the bill and wanted more information.” Colorado Democrat Betsy Markey specifically credits Tea Party pressure for getting her interested in the bill, which she decided to cosponsor. “There’s a lot of anger from both sides of the aisle towards the Fed, not necessarily coming from the same position or working towards the same goals,” Martin-Ross writes. “But everyone wants to be seen as being in favor of transparency.”

Paul recognizes that the growing support for auditing the Fed does not indicate similar enthusiasm for his more radical goal of abolishing the central bank. He has introduced another bill to do just that, and it has yet to attract a single cosponsor. H.R. 1207 supporters, by contrast, “sign on because it doesn’t do” anything like that, Paul says. “It doesn’t direct policy changes. I did that on purpose.”

Paul’s beef with the central bank is a by-product of his longstanding interest in the works of Austrian school economists, most prominently Ludwig von Mises and Nobel laureate F.A. Hayek. Paul was a fan of Mises and Hayek before he entered politics in the mid-’70s, largely as a result of his reading the publications of the libertarian Foundation for Economic Education.

Paul, like the economists he admires, thought it a mistake to have a giant government-run institution trying to fix prices—in this case, interest rates, or the price of loaned money, which is the Fed’s main mechanism for pursuing its stated goals of economic growth, high employment, and relatively stable prices. As a critic of state power, Paul also worries that once a government has total control over paper money that it can create at will, it becomes too easy and too tempting for the state to spend at will. Cash unbacked by gold will flow to help the government out of its jams, pay for its wars, and appease its most powerful private constituents.

To Austrian-leaning libertarians like Paul, this danger makes the Federal Reserve, central banking, and “fiat” money the key libertarian issue. If the government can manufacture all the money it wants, the fight for limited government is over before it begins.

Central to this critique is the Austrian business cycle theory, which helped win Hayek his Nobel Prize for economics in 1974. Hayek, Mises, and contemporary economists such as Roger Garrison of Auburn University and Steve Horwitz of St. Lawrence University argue that low interest rates set by the Fed fool investors and builders into thinking that consumer demand for future goods is higher than it actually is. Cheap money makes producers more likely to launch long-term projects and take on long-term expenses. When low rates are a product of government intervention, rather than a market expression of people’s desire for long-term goods as reflected in their willingness to save now in order to consume more later, those long-term projects—for example, building and buying homes—will turn out to be unsustainable “malinvestments.” Prices in those areas will plunge. Everyone will start to realize that resources were funneled to unprofitable ends. An exaggerated boom will turn into a catastrophic bust.

Austrians believe increases in the money supply don’t always manifest in economy-wide rises in the consumer price index, the standard definition of inflation. The excess cash might instead flow into specific areas of the economy, depending on real-world factors that vary from case to case. In the housing boom and bust, those factors included mortgage lending standards, the actions of the government-created mortgage holders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and reckless securitization of mortgages. In the Fed skeptics’ story about the last decade’s economic expansions and contractions, the housing bubble was a deliberate effort by the Fed to stave off economic troubles that began when the tech-stock bubble burst in 2000.

Who Else Is Afraid of the Federal Reserve?

A small but enthusiastic audience, largely connected with explicitly libertarian institutions, has kept the Austrian theory of Fed culpability alive in the decades since Mises and Hayek left the scene. (Mises died in 1973, Hayek in 1992.) But the Austrians aren’t the only opponents of the Fed’s practices. Although history tends to craft auras of inevitability around what exists, the Federal Reserve would have seemed an exotic and dangerous change in American monetary practice in the 19th century.

According to a popular Fed creation myth, the bank, established in 1913, brought an end to a chaotic, boom-and-bust environment of unregulated banking, replacing it with managed economic stability. This story is widely believed despite the fact that America’s most severe banking crisis and economic downturn, the Great Depression, occurred two decades after the Fed was created. As the popular historian (and no Austrian ideologue) Jack Weatherford wrote in his 1997 book The History of Money, “the final stripping of local banks of their power to control money came not because of financial failures but as a result of political movements to centralize power in Washington.”

Opposition to central banks and paper money runs strong through American history. Many of the Founding Fathers came to despise paper currency after their experience with the quickly worthless Revolutionary War “continental.” President Andrew Jackson crushed the Second Bank of the United States in 1832 in the name of the people. President James Buchanan noted after an 1857 bank panic that “our existing misfortunes have proceeded solely from our extravagant and vicious system of paper money.” The Civil War “greenback,” our first national government pure paper currency, was initially declared unconstitutional until a later Supreme Court bowed to political reality. And then there was the debate over establishing the Federal Reserve itself, in which opponents such as Sen. Elihu Root (R-N.Y.) noted the dangers of a potentially unlimited money supply.

In the postwar era of normality and economic centrism, noisy mistrust of the Fed was the province of gold fanatics, radical libertarians, and financial newsletter writers and readers who saw the bank as a machine the government used to debase the currency and steal from the thrifty. But the Fed also earned the ire of progressive leftists who saw it as the citadel of moneyed interests helping creditors at the expense of debtors by keeping inflation too low. The critique, which was especially audible from the Volcker era forward, is exemplified by the progressive journalist William Greider’s best-selling 1987 book on the Fed, Secrets of the Temple. It follows the grand tradition of the three-time Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan, who famously wanted to rescue indebted farmers through using cheaper and more abundant silver as money rather than crucifying them on a “cross of gold.”

During a time when the Fed actually lived up to its much-vaunted, often spurious “independence from political pressure”—when Paul Volcker was using the shock therapy of high interest rates and lower money supply growth to crush inflation in the early 1980s—the Fed came under political pressure from across the ideological spectrum. Its critics included Sen. Robert Byrd (D–W. Va.) and Rep. Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) as well as many members of the Reagan administration. But for most of the tenure of Alan “Maestro” Greenspan, the Fed was broadly seen as doing little wrong.

Yet Paul discovered during his presidential bid that anti-Fed feeling had somehow morphed into a popular youth phenomenon. At an Iowa campus stop in 2007, the candidate and I expressed mutual wonder at the fact that his biggest applause line was not about ending the war but about reining in the Fed. At other Paul events, I’m told, kids burned Federal Reserve notes (dollar bills to you) to show their hostility toward the unrestricted and damaging flow of fiat currency.

As that flamboyant gesture indicates, anti-Fed feeling has long overlapped with powerful populist passions. Sometimes that attaches itself to misleading history and misaimed anger. Conspiracy theorists often cite the fact that the Fed is officially owned by its 12 private member banks as evidence that the whole system is a means for private bankers to mulct the public. But in its creation, purpose, and function, the Fed is a branch of government. Its board of governors is selected by the president and approved by the Senate, and most of its income ends up in the U.S. Treasury. And contrary to claims that the law creating the bank was pushed through Congress in the dead of night before Christmas 1913 solely as a result of a banker’s conspiracy forged on Jekyll Island, the Fed arose from long public and congressional debate.

Opposing something that has long been deemed as essential as air tends to attract eccentric people with eccentric beliefs. When I ask Ron Paul where this unexpected upsurge in youthful disdain for the Fed was coming from, he says the most important source was the website of the Mises Institute, an educational foundation for Austrian economics and libertarian political thought. But beyond the economic arguments against fiat currency, Paul says the biggest feeders of popular fear of the Fed are the conspiracy-minded documentary America: Freedom to Fascism and radio host Alex Jones, staunch opponent of the New World Order. In both cases Fed opposition is part of a general theory of sinister and subterranean forces struggling to keep Americans enslaved.

It certainly was no credit to the anti-Fed movement that Holocaust museum shooter James von Brunn had previously been arrested for attempting a “citizen’s arrest” of the Fed’s governors. And when the U.S. Army Reserve issued a “Force Projection Advisory” in November 2008 specifically targeting that month’s anti-Fed protests for “situational awareness and recommended mitigation measures,” it allowed those on the fringe to feel validation that they were not only right all along but a genuine threat to their enemies.

But the profound effects of the Fed’s avowed purpose—manipulating interest rates and making paper currency—are damaging enough, at least for those who see its fingerprints all over the current crisis, to make more baroque conspiracy theorizing superfluous. And when it comes to mistrusting the Fed, the Alex Jones crowd is not alone.

We’re All Austrians Now

Economists, pundits, and financial analysts are not exactly gathering by the hundreds in front of Federal Reserve buildings and chanting “End the Fed!” But it has become almost impossible to avoid respectable voices in respectable venues laying some of the blame for the economic crisis at the Fed’s discount window.

The Berkeley economist Brad DeLong, a popular blogger and former Clinton Treasury Department official who once dismissed Mises’ general monetary theory as “batshit insane,” still told this story in the October 2008 issue of the liberal American Prospect: “The current financial crisis has its roots in Greenspan’s decision to keep interest rates very low in 2002 and 2003 to head off the danger of a deflation-induced double-dip recession.…Six months ago, I would have said that his judgment was probably correct. Today… I can no longer state that Greenspan made the right calls with respect to the level of interest rates and the housing bubble in the 2000s.”

Fed bashing in a roughly Austrian style has gotten so popular that the theory’s opponents now feel embattled. Scott Sumner, a monetary economist at Bentley University who writes the much-cited blog The Money Illusion, thinks the Federal Reserve was and is too tight with interest rates and money for optimal economic performance. “As everyone knows by now,” Sumner complained in June, “the once kooky and discredited Austrian business cycle model has now become conventional wisdom.”

Blame-the-Fed sentiment now stretches across the spectrum of economic thought, from Keynesians such as DeLong to monetarists (who generally want the bank to maintain a fixed rate of money supply growth). In October 2008, the monetarist Anna Schwartz, co-author with Milton Friedman of one of the most important books of monetary economics, A Monetary History of the United States, told The Wall Street Journal: “If you investigate individually the manias that the market has so dubbed over the years, in every case, it was expansive monetary policy that generated the boom in an asset. The particular asset varied from one boom to another. But the basic underlying propagator was too-easy monetary policy and too-low interest rates that induced ordinary people to say, well, it’s so cheap to acquire whatever is the object of desire in an asset boom, and go ahead and acquire that object.”

In February 2009 the Stanford economist John Taylor, a monetary whiz so influential that there is a rule for setting interest rates named after him, told The Wall Street Journal: “The Fed held its target interest rate, especially in 2003–2005, well below known monetary guidelines that say what good policy should be based on historical experience. Keeping interest rates on the track that worked well in the past two decades, rather than keeping rates so low, would have prevented the boom and the bust.”

Even the Obama administration has gotten into the act. “Monetary policy around the world was too loose too long,” Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner told PBS interviewer Charlie Rose in March. “And that created this just huge boom in asset prices, money chasing risk. People trying to get a higher return. That was just overwhelmingly powerful.”

As with any issue in political economy, there’s disagreement. There are a variety of arguments to parry or blunt the Austrian theory. Former Federal Reserve Board economist Arnold Kling, for instance, argues that the modern world of money and credit is so convoluted, with so many avenues for the creation of money-like instruments outside of direct Fed control, that the Fed shouldn’t be seen as the main villain in any credit-driven collapse. At worst, Kling thinks, it’s a hapless bungler pretending to power it can never have. Bryan Caplan, a libertarian economist at George Mason University, thinks people are generally too smart to be fooled enough by false interest rate signals that they precipitate an economic crisis.

And pinning even partial blame for the current economy on the Fed is different from questioning its legitimacy. By limiting his bill to the narrow question of transparency, Paul is making it possible to create a broad political coalition that can agree the Fed needs to be kept in check without necessarily agreeing on why, or on what the Fed ought to be doing.

The Fed Forever?

Despite the palpable momentum behind H.R. 1207, the idea of inconveniencing the Fed with anything more severe than an audit still seems like a far-off fantasy. Meltdown author Woods notes that, although many mainstream analysts are jumping on the Austrian bandwagon to explain the causes of the crisis, none of them are really embracing the Austrian solution of ending the Fed’s power to manipulate interest rates at will. They just call for the power to be used more prudently next boomtime.

The Fed was an ideological and institutional response to a convincingly told story of crisis and solution—basically, that the 19th-century system of mostly private banks issuing their own mostly gold-backed paper was leading to too many small economic crises of the sort that used to be called “bank panics.” Milton Friedman, a critic of central banking practice, at the same time dismissed attempts to return to a commodity standard such as gold. One of his reasons was that it was “not feasible because the mythology and beliefs required to make it effective do not exist.” But with best-selling books, activists in the street, members of Congress, and economists across the ideological spectrum casting aspersions on Fed practice, we may see the crafting of a new set of myths and beliefs.

In this time of political ferment, Stephen Axilrod, a longtime Federal Reserve staff director and monetary policy guru, has issued a memoir from MIT Press titled Inside the Fed. Axilrod admits that Fed interest rate actions precipitated the crisis without letting that fact dent either his admiration for the institution or his belief in its necessity. Still, Axilrod notes something that should encourage Fed skeptics of all varieties: that “a country’s monetary policy is almost necessarily limited by conditions generated from the political, philosophic, and social ethos of the time.”

We are now seeing attempts to move the ethos in an anti-Fed direction. While it’s hard to imagine an America without an institution that has become so central, it’s interesting to contemplate something former Rep. Eldridge Spaulding (R-N.Y.) said in 1868, in the midst of the legal controversy over Civil War greenbacks: “No one would now think of passing a legal tender act making the promises of the Government…a legal tender in payment of ‘all debts public and private.’ Such a law could not be sustained for one moment.”

What anyone would think can change dramatically. Ron Paul, through his Fed audit bill, is trying to get his colleagues, and the American people, to change what and how they think about the central bank. Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, told a Massachusetts town hall meeting in August that he believes the House will indeed pass H.R. 1207 in October.

All the anti-Fed agitation we’ve seen in the last couple of years may eventually feel like a footnote if the current binge of monetary expansion creates something Americans haven’t seen for a quarter century: substantial and painful inflation in the consumer price index. For now, Bernanke is trying to assure Congress and the public that the Fed governors are skilled and knowledgeable enough to know when they need to “neutralize” the new money by, for example, selling bonds to the market and essentially swallowing the money back up before prices spike.

But the Fed doesn’t have a stellar track record of timing monetary shifts with scientific precision, and any actions that rein in inflation, thereby cutting off the short-term stimulative effect that governments love, are bound to be politically dangerous both to the Fed and to the president who appoints its overseers. As Bernanke admitted at his televised town hall meeting in July, the Fed can maintain its independence only if it can “show that we are producing good results,” and while he added lip service to independence, the people he must show those results to are Congress and the administration. Though he was appointed to a new four-year term in August, if he flubs inflation, Bernanke will be facing a whole new wave of political attacks.

More generally, the Fed’s independence is threatened by a growing understanding that the Austrian interpretation of central banking’s risks might be correct: Keeping interest rates too low for too long can precipitate severe economic busts. “It’s hard to imagine the little spark that can make big change,” says Austrian business cycle theorist Steve Horwitz, “but it can happen if the drumbeat stays going. The Fed was created by Congress, so we won’t get major change until members of Congress perceive their constituents or people with political, cultural, and social power saying there’s something really seriously wrong here.”

Senior Editor Brian Doherty (bdoherty@reason.com) is the author of This is Burning Man (BenBella), Radicals for Capitalism (PublicAffairs), and Gun Control on Trial (Cato Institute). This column first appeared at Reason.com.

Time to Repeal Massachusetts' Pacheco Law

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 12:56:00 EDT

Massachusetts State Senate Minority Leader Richard Tisei and State Rep. Jeffery Perry write in separate op-eds (in The Boston Globe and the Cape Cod Times, respectively) that the state's ongoing fiscal crisis demands real government reform, and they suggest that the state could save over $1 billion through a series of reforms that include repealing the state's anti-privatization Pacheco Law. As Perry writes:

Since this anti-privatization measure was approved during the Weld administration, the state has lost out on the opportunity to save hundreds of millions of dollars through the outsourcing of certain government programs and services. The law has effectively stifled state privatization efforts by keeping most work in-house, even when a private company could potentially deliver the same services more efficiently and at a lesser cost.

As I wrote in Reason Foundation's Annual Privatization Report 2009, the 2009 legislative session in Massachusetts saw increased interest in tweaking the Pacheco Law:

The state's "Pacheco Law"—a 1993 procurement statute that many observers say has created numerous procedural obstacles to the privatization of state services—came under scrutiny in May 2009 amid legislative negotiations over the state's FY 2010 budget, which will require closing a $1.5 billion deficit.

By an 11-28 vote, the Senate rejected a budget amendment that would have repealed the law. Amendment opponents argued that the strict law serves an important oversight function and that its repeal would threaten state jobs. Supporters countered with several arguments in favor of repeal:

•Repealing the law would help the state do more with less through privatization, potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars that could support vital programs.

•The privatization of state services has effectively stopped as a result of the highly restrictive provisions of the law.

•One provision of the law requires state agencies to compare the cost of using private contractors to a hypothetical cost if state employees were to optimize the efficiency of current service delivery, ignoring the true costs of current service delivery.

•The state auditor already has the authority to unilaterally reject contracts he deems "not in the public interest."

But the Senate did approve, 24-15, a separate budget amendment that would exempt all contracts under $2 million in value from the provisions of the Pacheco Law, which currently applies to contracts over $200,000. According to amendment supporters, raising the cap would facilitate more privatization and help the state save millions of dollars.

Let's be honest about it—this law should have never existed in the first place and represents a cynical political attempt to appease public employee unions by stacking the deck against privatization from the get-go. At a time of record deficits, policymakers should be focused on removing unnecessary and counterproductive laws and rules that stand in the way of streamlining government. Ironically, with the law in place, the public employee unions that fought to pass and subsequently protect this law actually made their jobs a little less safe, which is precisely the opposite of what they intended. After all, if you're not outsourcing very many services (driving up costs) and government gets as bloated as it is in Massachusetts, then when it comes time to close a multi-billion budget deficit, by definition the public employees will automatically bear the brunt of the cuts.

Instead of fighting privatization, it might be more sensible to public employees to just embrace competition, as the costs savings generated by privatization will work to reduce the pressure on the state budget over time, which would be a win-win for both the public employees and contractor community.

» Reason Foundation's Privatization Research and Commentary

Financial Market Reform

miron@fas.harvard.edu (Jeffrey Miron) — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 10:57:00 EDT

In the coming weeks and months, Congress will be turning its attention to financial market reform, in hopes of avoiding future financial crises. According to perceived wisdom, the root cause of the 2008 financial crisis was excessive risk-taking, and proper regulation can detect and prevent such excess in the future.

This view is a pipe dream. Most new regulation will do nothing to limit crises because markets will innovate around it. Worse, some regulation being considered by Congress will guarantee bigger and more frequent crises.

Government-Induced Moral Hazard Caused the Crisis

The Financial Crisis of 2008 did not occur because of insufficient or ill-designed regulation. Rather, it resulted from two misguided government policies.

The first was the attempt to promote homeownership. Numerous policies have pursued this goal for decades, and over time they have focused mainly on homeownership for low-income households. These policies encouraged mortgage lending to borrowers with shaky credit characteristics, such as limited income or assets, and on terms that defied common sense, such as zero down payment.

The pressure to expand risky credit was especially problematic because of the second misguided policy, the long-standing practice of bailing out failures from private risk-taking. This practice meant that financial markets expected the government to cushion any losses from a crash in mortgage debt. Thus, the historical tendency to bail out creditors created an enormous moral hazard.

One crucial component of this moral hazard was the now infamous “Greenspan put,” the Fed’s practice under Chairman Alan Greenspan of lowering interest rates in response to financial disruptions that might otherwise cause a crash in asset prices. In the early to mid-2000s, in particular, the Fed made a conscious decision not to burst the housing bubble and instead to “fix things” if a crash occurred.

It was inevitable, however, that a crash would ensue; the expansion of mortgage credit made sense only so long as housing prices kept increasing, and at some point this had to stop. Once it did, the market had no option but to unwind the positions built on untenable assumptions about housing prices. Thus government pressure to take risk, combined with implicit insurance for this risk, were the crucial causes of the bubble and the crash. Inadequate financial regulation played no significant role.

New Regulation Must Avoid Moral Hazard

If government-induced moral hazard caused the crisis, then new regulation should avoid creating or exacerbating this perverse incentive. Yet two components of proposed regulation will increase, rather than decrease, the chances for moral hazard.

One proposed change in regulation would give the Federal Reserve increased power to supervise financial institutions, especially bank holding companies such as Citigroup or Bank of America. This approach is a triumph of hope over experience. Why should an expanded Fed role be beneficial when the Fed erred so badly in the previous instance?

Defenders of an expanded Fed role will claim that, in the lead up to the crisis, the Fed did not have explicit powers to supervise and monitor non-bank financial institutions, and that such powers could have avoided the crisis.

Yet during the years before the crisis, the Fed had more than ample power to recognize the unprecedented level of risk that was building in the economy and to issue stern warnings, whether or not it had explicit regulatory authority. In fact, far from cautioning the market to behave, the Fed promoted the notion that it could solve any problems that might result from a bursting of the housing bubble.

Regulators are fallible. Alan Greenspan, once thought to be the Maestro, got it fabulously wrong. Ben Bernanke, regardless of the merit’s of his stewardship, will not be Fed chairman forever. Centralized and expanded power to make things better is also centralized and expanded power to make things worse. In particular, any mistakes made by a powerful, centralized authority have a magnified impact because they distort the behavior of the entire market.

Just as problematic as granting the Fed additional powers is the proposal to allow the FDIC to resolve bank holding companies using taxpayer funds. Under the proposed arrangement, the FDIC rather than bankruptcy courts would be responsible for bank holding companies, and the FDIC would be authorized to make loans to failed institutions, to purchase their debts and other assets, to assume or guarantee their obligations, and to acquire equity interests. The funds would be borrowed from Treasury.

This means that FDIC resolution of bank holding companies would put taxpayer skin in the game, a radical departure from standard bankruptcy and an approach that mimics the actions of the U.S. Treasury under TARP. Thus, the new approach would institutionalize TARP.

The result will be that under the proposed system, bank holding companies would forever more regard themselves as explicitly, not just implicitly, backstopped by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury. That is moral hazard in the extreme, and it will create an unprecedented incentive for excessive risk-taking by these institutions.

The Bankruptcy Approach

The only way to limit financial panics is to eliminate government-induced moral hazard, and that means letting failed institutions fail. Whether resolution is carried out by the FDIC or a bankruptcy court is not the crucial question; rather, it is whether that resolution process forces all the losses on the institution’s stakeholders rather than bailing them out with taxpayer funds.

The standard objection to allowing failures is that some financial institutions are allegedly so large or interconnected that their failure causes a breakdown of the credit mechanism, thereby harming the whole economy rather than just transmitting losses that have already occurred. According to this view, letting Lehman Brothers fail was a crucial mistake that initiated the meltdown, and bailing out other financial institutions was a necessary evil to prevent even further chaos. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Rather than being a cause, Lehman’s failure was merely the signal that time had come for the U.S. economy to pay the price for all the distortions caused by the misguided policies toward housing and risk. Given those distortions, a massive unwinding and restructuring was necessary to make the economy healthy again.

This restructuring required lower residential investment, declines in stock and housing prices, and shrinkage of the financial sector. All of this implied a recession, even without any impact of financial institution failures on the credit mechanism, and the recession meant that lending would contract, even without a credit crunch.

The bailout itself, moreover, caused much of the financial market turmoil. The announcement that the Treasury was considering a bailout scared markets and froze credit because bankers did not want to realize their losses if government was going to bail them out. The bailout introduced uncertainty because no one knew what the bailout meant. The bailout did little to make balance sheets transparent, yet the market’s inability to determine who was solvent was a key reason for the credit freeze.

Thus letting Lehman fail was the right decision; bailing out Bear Stearns, Fannie, and Freddie in advance of Lehman, and the rest of Wall Street afterwards, were the mistakes. For all its warts, bankruptcy rather than bailout is the right way to resolve non-bank financial institutions. Any regulation that formalizes bailouts creates an enormous moral hazard and a black hole for taxpayer funds.

The Future

To limit future financial crises, policy must first avoid the distortions inherent in the attempt to expand homeownership. This means eliminating the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Community Reinvestment Act, the deductibility of mortgage interest, the homestead exclusion in the personal bankruptcy code, the tax-favored treatment of capital gains on housing, the HOPE for Homeowners Act, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (the bailout bill), and the Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan. None of this is sensible policy.

In addition, policy must end its proclivity to bail out private risk-taking. This second task is difficult, since it requires policymakers to “tie their own hands.” Specific changes in policies and institutions can nevertheless support this goal. The first is avoiding new regulation that makes bailouts more likely. A second is repealing all existing financial regulation, since this would signal markets that they, and only they, can truly protect themselves from risk.

The third and perhaps most important way to reduce moral hazard is to eliminate the Federal Reserve. As long as the Fed exists, it will regard itself as, and be regarded as, the economic insurer of last resort. In a world with perfect information, appropriately humble central bankers, and an absence of political influence on monetary policy, such a protector might enhance the economy’s performance on average.

In the world we live in, none of these conditions will hold consistently, so the potential for policy-induced disasters is large. The U.S. economy prospered for its first 125 years without a central bank. It’s time to try that approach again.

Jeffrey A. Miron is Senior Lecturer and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Economics at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at The Cato Institute. He blogs at http://jeffreymiron.blogspot.com. This column first appeared at Reason.com.

Privatization News Roundup, Oct. 23, 2009

leonard.gilroy@reason.org (Leonard Gilroy) — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 15:16:00 EDT

Some privatization news highlights from the last week that haven't been covered elsewhere on the blog:

FEDERAL

"GAO: Army shouldn't privatize West Point jobs," The Associated Press
"Panel Recommends Privatization of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac," Talk Radio News Service
"Justice kicks off planning phase of $1.5B contract," Washington Technology

STATE & LOCAL:

"Puerto Rico to Use Private-Partnership Proceeds to Repay Bonds," Bloomberg
"Arresting Developments," Barron's
"Miami Tunnel Reaches Closure," The Bond Buyer
"Despite speed bumps, Port of Miami tunnels continued attracting lender interest," Miami Today
"Lawmakers eye using budget as a tool against Northrop Grumman in IT deal," Richmond Times Dispatch
"Montana Airport to Privatize Security Screening," Security Management
"Airport to privatize security," Daily Inter Lake
"Colorado prison cuts possible elsewhere," Denver Post
"Fire department should keep going to medical emergencies, committee says," Record-Searchlight
"Village gets bid by company to construct sewer system," The Reporter

INTERNATIONAL:

"Scottish Think-tank Propose PFI Replacement," PPPFocus.com
"Private firms model for projects," BBC News
"UK's Royal Mint Workers Protest Against Privatization Plans," Bloomberg
"Japan Post Goes in New Direction," Wall Street Journal
"Makeover of postal privatization," The Japan Times
"France: Voters Reject Postal Privatization," Toward Freedom blog
"Russia may privatize certain state corporations - Medvedev," RIA Novosti
"Poland Banks on Privatizations to Plug Budget," BusinessWeek
"Zambia Shortlists Eight In Privatization Of Zamtel," Wall Street Journal
"Public-private partnerships contribute to country's development," AngolaPress
"Zimbabwe: Privatization Opens Massive Infrastructure Opportunities," AllAfrica.com
"Government announces new wave of privatization," Daily Georgian Times
"More private finance initiatives to reduce budget deficit," Malaysia Star
"6 power plants to be privatized next year," Manila Bulletin

» Reason Foundation's Annual Privatization Report 2009
» Reason Foundation's Privatization Research and Commentary

Consumer Financial Protection Vagary

kmw@reason.com (Katherine Mangu-Ward) — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 12:43:00 EDT

Handing out small loans against future paychecks had absolutely nothing to do with last year's market meltdown, but federal regulators have been itching to get their hands on the the payday lending industry for years, and yesterday's committee vote on the creation of a new omnibus agency to control all financial products was the perfect opportunity.

The House Financial Services Committee voted 39 to 20 on Thursday to create a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA). The stated goal of the proposed law, which will now move to a broader vote, is to consolidate regulation of financial products and use the resulting agency to monitor the use of sub-prime mortgages and other high-risk, complicated financial products.

In contrast to the complex instruments that helped bring about the financial crisis, payday loans are astonishingly low tech: Applicants bring in a stack of paper showing that they have a job and a bank account, write a paper check in a physical store for the amount they will owe when the loan comes due, and walk away with a handful of cash. These localized, low-key transactions are hardly the stuff of innovative high finance, but that hasn't stopped Congress and the president from purposefully conflating ordinary, everyday financial practices they deem unsavory with those that caused a global financial meltdown.

During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama promised to “work to empower more Americans in the fight against predatory lending” by capping “outlandish interest rates.” Obama also said he wants to extend the 2007 law imposing a 35 percent cap on interest rates for loans charged to members of the armed forces and their families to "all Americans." He's now well on his way, and if the CFPA becomes law, he'll be able to count it as a much-needed legislative victory. Payday lending has become a talking point for financial regulators, something that ordinary voters—who find derivatives confusing—can understand. The historical image of payday lenders as unsavory loan sharks and more recent stories of folks caught in debt spirals make the industry seem unsavory, ripe for regulation.

A press release on the committee's website is a study in the confused rhetoric of these new regulations, jumbling together several distinct types of financial products, crowing about "extend[ing] federal supervision to a host of financial industries, such as payday lenders and mortgage originators, which have long escaped oversight" and asserting that, "As last year’s crisis demonstrated, deceptive financial products—such as predatory mortgages and hidden credit card fees—not only damage the livelihoods of American families, but can destabilize the entire economy." The use and abuse of credit cards and payday loans may be indicators of the overall financial health of the country, bu they had nothing to do with the 2008 crash.

The press release also includes a quote from Rep. Brad Miller (D-NC): “The Committee vote today is a rifle shot at abusive financial practices, not a shotgun blast that would hit community banks making an honest living from fair lending practices. It’s no surprise that the lenders with the worst practices are still fighting tooth and nail against this bill. The last thing they want is to have to make an honest living.”

Small banks have managed to get out from under most of the harsh new regulations—probably because they call themselves "community banks." And who doesn't like community? Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, told The Wall Street Journal last week that community banks "were not the cause of this" and agreed to an exception for small banks that would allow them to continue dealing with their current regulators rather than the new consolidated federal agency. The same might be said of payday lenders, and yet Frank had harsh words indeed for them, singling out payday lenders and promising to "adopt a system of regulating the non-bank, non-regulating competitors who are frankly worse for both the consumer and the economy."

Naturally, the payday lending industry is freaking out. And when Congress and the president join forces to regulate an industry, there's only one thing for it: lobbyists. When ordinary people go to payday lenders, they get $100 or $200 in cash as an advance on their paychecks. When payday lenders go to Congress, they get considerably more. The industry spent $4.2 million on lobbying during the 110th Congress (which ended in January 2009), and gave $1.5 million in the 2008 election cycle. In the past, payday lenders have mostly concentrated their lobbying efforts at the state level, to mixed success. But the threat at the federal level is real this time around and the lobbying dollars reflect that. Stay tuned for part two of the debate, when would-be regulators cite the massive amount of lobbying dollars as further evidence of the industry's corruption.

Katherine Mangu-Ward is a senior editor at Reason magazine. This column first appeared at Reason.com.